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Everyday economic life involves not only decisions an individual makes for herself, but also
decisions an individual makes in the context of a larger group. Some examples of these
collective actions involve choosing to wear a face-mask during the pandemic, voting in
elections, deciding to get vaccinated, or choosing to engage in a pro-environment activity
like recycling. In many of these cases, actions do not translate directly into the final
outcome. They are consequential only in a limited sense, either because the likelihood of
being pivotal in the outcome is low (as in the case of voting), or because the magnitude
of the action is very small in the larger picture (as in the case of recycling).
The first chapter of this dissertation is built on the fact that we often observe policy
interventions to encourage individual contributions to such collective actions. Several
measures are in place across countries to ‘nudge’ individuals to engage in pro-environment
behaviours. For example, the Nordic Council of Ministers in 2016 recommended the use of
interventions such as providing individuals with peer comparisons on energy consumption
and offering renewable energy as the default source. Another measure is the proposed
European Union restrictions on the use of single-use plastics.1 While the effect of these
policies on target behaviours like energy consumption and use of single-use plastics is
extensively documented, little is known about how these interventions affect non-target
pro-environment behaviours.
My paper, titled “Are pro-environment behaviours substitutes or complements?” looks
at the effect of interventions on non-target behaviours. I set up a field experiment in India




to study how an intervention to increase one pro-environment activity, namely, recycling
single-use plastic carry bags, spills over to other pro-environment activities like planting
trees, using public transport, or reducing air-pollution. Single-use plastic recycling centers
were set up in 30 schools covering over 3,750 students, for over a year. Monthly collection
drives are organized in these schools where students can bring items to recycle. The
baseline recycling levels are close to zero across all the schools.
The interventions are rolled out as follows. The first group is the control group where
there is no intervention. In the second group I provide students with information on the
environmental consequences of single-use plastics and the need to recycle them. In the
third group students are given incentives to recycle in addition to the information content.
To identify spillovers from these interventions to other pro-environment behaviours, I use
simultaneous lab-in-the-field experiments. I collect data on students’ willingness to pay
(WTP) for a list of pro-environment activities before and after the interventions in all
three treatments.
I find that providing information alone does not change the recycling behaviour,
whereas an additional incentive significantly increases the average recycling levels.
Students in this treatment who increase their recycling levels also increase their
willingness to pay for other pro-environment activities. This indicates a positive
spillover from the intervention. To discuss possible channels through which these
spillovers operate, I complement the data from the field with administrative data on
socio-demographic characteristics and survey data on environmental awareness, intrinsic
motivation to engage in environment activities, and elicited classroom norms on
pro-environment behaviours.
The second and third chapters in the dissertation focus on another dimension of
collective action - voting behaviour. Since the likelihood of individual actions changing
the final outcome is close to zero and most of these activities involve at least a small
cost, a straightforward cost-benefit analysis implies that individuals do not engage in
them. Yet, we see positive participation in collective actions, such as voter turnouts in
elections. Due to the very low chance that a single vote tips the outcome, voters are
often guided by reasons other than changing the results. These motivations to vote are
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collectively called the ‘expressive motives’. The second chapter of the dissertation
provides a comprehensive overview of the various expressive motives individuals state
regarding why they turn out to vote. This chapter uses an online survey conducted in
April 2019 in the United States to identify several expressive voting motives and
quantify the relative importance of each of them.
The results indicate that one of the main reasons for respondents go to polls is the desire
to be part of the democratic process irrespective of whether they can change the outcome.
Many of the respondents also believe that if they do not vote, they cannot complain about
the government or the state of the democracy at a later stage. Individuals who belong
to racial minorities state that they turn out to vote because voting is a privilege not
extended to their past generations.
The paper also finds that the likelihood that an individual votes expressively is
positively correlated with other expressive political behaviours like donations to
political parties, participating in a demonstration, and posting political opinions online.
Additionally, individuals who identify with certain dimensions of ‘being a good citizen’
are more likely to vote expressively. Older individuals and those with higher income and
education levels are also more likely to state that they engage in expressive voting.
The third chapter, based on joint work with Kai A. Konrad (Konrad and Sherif (2019)),
explores another dimension of voting behaviour - whether voters can ensure that their
elected office-holders remain accountable to them. Once elected, office-holders can use
their position to extract rents for themselves at the expense of the voters unless voters
keep them in check. An effective mechanism to keep office-holders in check is retrospective
voting, where voters punish an unaccountable incumbent by removing them from office
at the next election. The threat of losing the re-election keeps office-holders accountable,
assuming that re-election is valuable to them.
However, being in office often provides office-holders with additional skills that make
them better law-makers and representatives. This experience is thus desirable from the
point of view of voters, who would rather re-elect a skilled incumbent than a challenger
with unknown skills. In such a setting, the incumbent office-holder has an evident
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advantage, as they know that the voters benefit from their re-election, giving them an
opportunity to extract rents. From the voter’s perspective, this incentive to re-elect an
experienced incumbent is at odds with using re-election as a tool to ensure
accountability. Voters in such a situation face the trade off between re-electing the
skilled incumbent and keeping the incumbent accountable. We examine whether it is
possible to ensure the accountability of the office-holder in such settings.
We consider the accountability problem in a theoretical model, using a voting
framework with multiple voters, where voters have strong incentives to re-elect the
incumbent. Incumbents in office have a budget that they can either distribute to the
voters (accountable behaviour) or keep for themselves. At the end of the office period,
they are up for re-election. The candidates only need a majority vote to be re-elected
and hence each voter is only pivotal with a small probability. These pivotality
considerations support equilibria where incumbents cultivate a favoured minimum
majorities and behave accountably only to this majority. Evidence from an
accompanying laboratory experiment confirm these theoretical results. We find that
there is heterogeneity among incumbents in terms of their accountability. Some
incumbents extract significant rents, others do not. Incumbents who extract much are
less likely to be re-elected. Although this is weaker when voters get a benefit from
re-election, we find that at least some degree of accountability is ensured. We also find
that voters correctly form beliefs about the probability of their vote being pivotal in the




Are pro-environment behaviours substitutes or
complements?
1.1 Introduction
Policy interventions aiming to encourage individuals to adopt pro-environment behaviours
are very common. A recent example is the proposed European Union ban on single-use
plastics.1 While this might lead to a reduction in the use of single-use plastics, little
is known about how this will affect other domains of pro-environment behaviours, for
example, using public transport or changing diet. Would individuals who reduce the
consumption of single-use plastics consider that they have done their share towards the
environment and reduce other pro-environment behaviours? Or do they increase other
pro-environment behaviours to be consistent with the broader goal? This paper looks
at the effect of interventions targeted at influencing one pro-environment behaviour on
other pro-environment behaviours.
I use a field experiment among school students in the state of Kerala, in India, to
study spillover effects from interventions. As part of the study, single-use plastic recycling
centers are set up across 30 schools covering over 3,750 students. The students can bring




plastic items to these school recycling centers, which are then counted, measured and
sorted by weight, and recycled at a centralized location.
These recycling centers are used to collect baseline data on individual student’s
recycling levels. After several months of baseline data collection, we divide the sample
schools into three treatment groups. The first group is the control group where there is
no intervention. In the second group of schools, called the information treatment, we
provide information on the environmental consequences of single-use plastics and why it
is important to recycle them. In the third group, the information plus incentive
treatment, we provide incentives to students to bring more items to recycle in addition
to communicating the information content that is the same as the treatment before.
I observe that the baseline recycling levels at all the schools are very low. They are
statistically not different from zero. I find that providing information alone does not
change the recycling behaviour. The incentive treatment, on the other hand, has a
positive and significant effect on the recycling levels of the students.
To measure the spillover effects from these interventions into other behaviours, I collect
data on students’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a list of seven environment activities before
and after the interventions in all three treatments. The WTP data is collected through a
lab-in-the-field experiment. Positive spillovers occur when the students are willing to pay
more for environment activities after the intervention than what they were willing to pay
before. We look if the changes in the WTP before and after interventions vary across the
treatments. We observe that the information treatment does not have any spillovers into
the WTPs for different environment activities. But the incentive treatment spills over
positively to each of the seven other environment activities. This result indicates that the
incentive intervention targeted at increasing recycling of single-use plastic bags increased
the WTP for other environment activities. This brings out the complementarities between
recycling of single-use plastics and other environment behaviours.
Since the realization that environmental quality depends significantly on human
behaviour, and given the ubiquity of behavioural tools, efforts at various scales have
been in place to encourage or ‘nudge’ individuals to adopt pro-environment behaviours.
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For example, the Nordic Council of Ministers in 2016 recommended using “nudging to
promote more environmentally friendly behaviour in energy consumption, waste, and
resource efficiency”. Some of the suggested nudges include provision of renewable energy
as the default choice of energy source or providing information on the energy use of
others to bring in peer comparisons and social norms. Other examples include
discounted or free parking spaces for low emission cars in the cities of Helsinki2 or
Leeds.3
In this context, this paper relates to three main fields of literature. The first is the
extensive literature on nudges aimed to encourage more pro-environment behaviours. The
array of choice architectures used to influence sustainable behaviours have included the
following mechanisms.
1. First, is information provision interventions like that of Allcott and Rogers (2014).
They study the effect of providing households with “home energy reports” that
include personalized energy reports and information on energy conservation.
Similarly Torres and Carlsson (2018) studies the effect of information campaigns
to encourage residential water savings in Colombia. Results indicate that social
information and appeals reduce household water use by 7%. A meta-analysis of
information interventions on energy conservation by Delmas et al. (2013) finds
significant reductions in individual energy use.
2. The second involves changing the defaults. For example, Araña and León (2013)
looks at the decision to pay for carbon offsetting policies by participants signing
up for a conference. They find that more participants contribute to carbon offsets
when the default was that the extra price was already included in the conference fee
and the participants had to opt out, compared to the default where the participants
had to opt in and actively choose to pay the extra amount. Similarly, Brown et al.
(2012) studies the effects of defaults on the thermostat settings of OECD employees.
They find that reducing the default setting leads to a reduction in the temperature




3. The third mechanism involves the use of social comparisons and norms. Farrow et al.
(2017) provides a meta-analysis of the different studies and concludes that various
social norm interventions cause significant and consistent changes in behaviour. The
effect of social comparisons and norms on household energy use has been extensively
documented by Nolan et al. (2008), Allcott and Rogers (2014), Schultz et al. (2007),
Ayres et al. (2013) and Ferraro and Price (2013).
4. Finally, studies have also looked at the effectiveness of changing the physical
environment. For example Kallbekken and Sælen (2013) shows that reducing
plate size in hotel restaurants reduces food waste by 20%.
Secondly, There is an active literature on spillovers between different pro-social
behaviours in general, and different environment behaviours in particular. Evans et al.
(2013) looks at the relationship between two pro-environment behaviours, namely,
recycling rates and car sharing. Their study suggests that there are some positive
spillovers from messages aimed at increasing car sharing to recycling. These occurred
when self-transcending reasons to promote car sharing (like protecting the environment)
are made salient, and not when self-interested reasons (e.g. economic reasons) are made
salient. Similarly, Lanzini and Thøgersen (2014) use self reported surveys to find a
positive relationship between “green” shopping and other pro-environment behaviours,
but these spillovers are limited to low cost behaviours. Other studies like Poortinga
et al. (2013) look at spillovers from a single-use carrier bag charge in Wales and find no
effects. Some studies also find a negative spillover from one environment activity to the
other. Tiefenbeck et al. (2013) finds that an intervention to reduce water use in
households achieved the goal, but increased the electricity consumption relative to the
pre-intervention baseline. Other studies that find a negative spillover between
environment activities are Sachdeva et al. (2009) and Klöckner et al. (2013). For a
summary of the research in the field see Truelove et al. (2014).
As evident from above, there is extensive research into the direct and indirect effects of
interventions on the target behaviour, however, little is known about how they influence
non-target behaviours. This paper contributes by providing empirical evidence on the
effectiveness of nudging in changing target behaviour as well as the spill over effects of
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these interventions on non-target, closely related behaviours. Another challenge in the
literature has been the difficulty in finding observational data on multiple environment
behaviours as individuals are highly likely to over report when asked about environment
behaviours. This makes causal estimation of spillovers difficult. I device a lab-in-the-
field experiment to overcome this challenge and collect data on multiple environment
behaviours.
Thirdly, the paper also relates to a growing literature on pro-social behaviours and
moral licensing, as in the broader context, pro-environment behaviours are a sub category
of pro-social behaviours. Gneezy et al. (2012) find that the cost of the initial pro-social
behaviour influences whether the said behaviour is repeated in the future. They find that,
if individuals engage in a costly pro-social behaviour, it serves as a signal of pro-social
identity and individuals are more likely to stick to that identity and repeat the behaviour.
On the other hand, if the behaviour is costless, there is no signalling and the behaviour
is repeated less often. Individuals may even reduce the behaviour, a finding consistent
with the growing literature on moral licensing (see Blanken et al. (2015) for an overview).
Moral licensing occurs when an individual initially behaving in a moral way (for example
engaging in a pro-social or pro-environment activity) finds it acceptable to later engage
in behaviours that are immoral or questionable. The initial good deed offers enough
moral credit or license to engage in later questionable behaviours. Evidence for moral
licensing is observed most frequently in charitable donations (Conway and Peetz (2012),
Sachdeva et al. (2009)). In the environmental domain Mazar and Zhong (2010) shows that
after shopping in a green store (a pro-environment activity) compared to a regular store,
people were more likely to engage in less ethical behaviour in lab experiments on dictator
games and lying games. Following this line of logic, interventions that encourage one
pro-environment action thus give individuals the license to reduce other pro-environment
actions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I describe the
design of the field experiment, lab-in-the-field experiment and sources of administrative
and survey data. Section 1.3 discusses the hypotheses and empirical strategy. Section
5
1.4 outlines the data and results. Section 1.5 discusses the possible mechanisms behind
the results and section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Research design
The experiment is conducted among school students aged 12 to 15 in the district of
Ernakulam in the state of Kerala in Southern India. Collection and safe disposal of solid
waste is a continuing challenge for the state of Kerala. The state currently relies on
a decentralized system of waste management where households themselves manage the
waste generated by either burning or burying the waste in their premises or dumping in
open spaces or water bodies (Government-of Kerala (2020)). Almost half of the municipal
waste generated in the state is collected by local government bodies and disposed in local
landfills. Plastic waste is occasionally separated at source; however, most of it eventually
ends up in the landfills or in water bodies, exacerbating pollution due to plastic waste on
the rivers, lakes and along its 560 km long coastline threatening biodiversity and human
lifestyle.
Thirty schools were randomly chosen to participate in the experiment, providing a
sample size of around 3750 students who are in classes 8 and 9. Schools are assigned
into three treatments with roughly 1250 students in each treatment based on power
calculations and a randomization algorithm.4
I look at different pro-environment behaviours of students, with a special focus on
recycling of single-use plastics. To do this, I set up a plastic waste collection facility
at all the schools in our sample. Plastic collection drives are organized once a month
and students are informed in advance of the days they can use the collection boxes at
schools to dispose their recyclable single-use plastic waste from home. There is no regular
recycling services offered by the city authorities. Once the students have brought items
to recycle and deposited them in our collection boxes, we sort them, count the number
of items, measure the weight and thickness, and take them to the centralized recycling
4The number of subjects required in each treatment was determined using power calculations. We
can detect effect sizes of .10 pp at α = 0.05 with power p > 0.05. The algorithm assumes that the
baseline recycling levels are similar across the three treatments.
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facility. The data on recycling of single-use plastics by the students is collected for over
nine months pre-intervention and three months post-intervention. The data set includes
monthly student level data on the number, total weight and composition of single-use
plastic items that the student recycles.
1.2.1 Treatments
After collecting baseline recycling data for nine months, the schools are divided into three
treatments as illustrated in figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Treatment design and timeline









Control treatment. In the schools that fall in the control treatment, we change
nothing and continue to measure the number of single-use plastic items that the students
bring to recycle.
INFO treatment. In the schools in the second treatment I provide information to
students on the need to recycle single-use plastics through posters and regular awareness
sessions. These awareness sessions involved classroom presentations by our research team
on the consequences of single-use plastics ending up in the landfills and rivers of Kerala. In
these sessions, the instructors emphasized the importance of recycling single-use plastics
and the impact it has on the environment. The research team followed the same script
in each of the classrooms that received the information treatment. Additionally, a poster
highlighting the need to recycle and the environmental benefits of recycling was put up
in each of the classrooms throughout the intervention period, serving as a reminder to
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the students. We continued to collect data on the amount of recycling of the students.
This treatment is referred as the INFO treatment.
INFO + INC treatment. Students in the schools in the third treatment are
incentivized to increase their recycling, in addition to receiving the above information
on the importance of recycling. The top five students in each class who recycle the most
(by item and by weight) received certificates from the district administration for their
contributions to the welfare of the state and were invited to a celebratory “evening with
a celebrity”. The awareness sessions remain exactly the same as the INFO treatment.
But at the end of the awareness sessions, the incentive structure is announced to the
students. Posters in the classrooms under this treatment highlighted both the
importance of recycling as well as the mentioned incentives. We continued to collect
data on the amount of recycling of the students. This treatment is referred as the INFO
+ INC treatment.
1.2.2 WTP for pro-environment behaviours: Lottery task
While the levels of recycling are directly observable, it is more challenging to observe
and accurately measure other different environment activities that the students may (or
may not) engage in. To capture dimensions of pro-environment behaviours in addition to
recycling, I conducted a lab experiment among the students. The experiment is designed
to elicit students’ willingness to pay for different environment activities like tree planting,
paper recycling, pollution reduction etc. The willingness to pay measure captures to what
extend students care about each of these activities, and in the absence of observational
data on environment activities, it serves as a close proxy.
I use a lottery task to elicit the WTP. Every student gets a lottery that gives them a
1/10 chance of winning 100 INR (≈ 1.50 USD, roughly equivalent to the average weekly
allowance for school children in towns in urban India.5)
Before drawing the winner of the lottery, students are given a list of 7 environment





3. Reduce air pollution
4. Reduce water pollution
5. Plant trees
6. Promote public transport
7. Save wildlife
They are then asked if they want to give a(ny) share of their earnings towards each
activity, in case they win. Students have to enter an amount (between 0 and 100, both
limits inclusive) that they are willing to give towards every activity item on the list.
The students are informed before they enter the amounts, that in case they win the
lottery, one of these activities will be randomly picked, the amount they agreed to spend
on the picked activity will be deducted and the rest paid to them. Students are informed
that we use the amount they give to perform the activity. Students receive the exact
details of how their contribution to a particular activity will be spent before they decide
their contributions. The contributions of every student is spent exactly in the same way.
For example, if a student gave 10 INR for planting trees, we use the money to buy saplings
and plant them in a particular location in the school district.6
Once the students have entered the amounts for the 7 activities, we draw the lottery.
For each of the winners we randomly pick an activity from the list. We deduct their
contributions to the picked activity from the prize money and pay the remaining to the
winner. The payoffs are realized immediately after the task. All the subjects undertake
6Contributions to plastic (paper) recycling is spent to run an awareness campaign in the city on
the need to recycle plastics (paper). Contributions to reduce air (water) pollution is spent to run an
awareness campaign in the city to reduce air (water) pollution. Contributions to promote public transport
is used to run an awareness campaign to increase the use of public transport among the city residents.
Contributions to save wildlife is spent on running a campaign to create awareness about and protect
endangered animals in the region.
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the lottery task a month before the treatment interventions and three months after the
interventions.
Such a task overcomes several difficulties encountered in observational data. Firstly, it
is not straightforward to come up with an exhaustive list of environment activities that
students across the 30 schools engage in. Even if a subset of these activities are identified,
we do not have observational data on to what extend students engage in them. Instead
of relying on self reported environmental activities that students engage in, we rely on
an experimental elicitation. Secondly, performing pro-environment activities are costly
for individuals (Thøgersen and Crompton (2009)). This poses a difficulty in analysing
observational data because we have to make additional assumptions on how these costs
are distributed among the different individuals. This cost is experimentally controlled
in the lottery task. Every individual is given a lottery with 1 in 10 chance of winning
100 INR. This is the maximum amount that the individual can spend on each of the
pro-environment activities. Keeping the costs the same is also important from the point
of view of Gneezy et al. (2012), who show that the cost of initial environment activities
can affect the direction of spillovers, with high cost initial action increasing the likelihood
of further pro-environment actions and vice-versa.
1.2.3 Survey questionnaire
Environment attitudes and behaviours. I use a survey questionnaire to collect data
on additional control measures like attitudes and beliefs of students towards environment,
different pro-environment activities that they undertake in everyday life and intrinsic
motivations towards engaging in pro-environment behaviours. Based on the responses in
the survey, an environment score is computed for all the subjects. The full survey design
and scoring is presented in the appendix.
Additionally, classroom norms pertaining to recycling and other pro-environment
behaviours are elicited in a two stage process consistent with the Krupka - Weber
elicitation method (Krupka and Weber (2013)). First, the students are asked a series of
four questions on their self-behaviour. These questions concern whether they recycle,
switch off electrical appliances after use, litter, or use disposable plastic cups and plates.
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After students have responded, they are informed that their classmates also answered
these questions, and are asked how many of their classmates said they engage in each of
the activities. Students are given a four point scale with options including “almost all
my classmates”, “some of my classmates”, “not a lot of my classmates” to “none of my
classmates”. If majority of the students believe that most of their classmates behave
pro-environmentally on the four questions, I categorize the classroom as having strong
norms regarding environment activities. The questionnaire for norm elicitation is also
presented in the appendix.
The survey also collects data on social desirability bias by using the Marlowe-Crowne
scale as developed by Crowne and Marlowe (1960) and Reynolds (1982). It measures the
respondent’s propensity to give responses that are considered socially desirable or those
responses that they think experimenters expect from them.
Other background data. Additional data collected includes socio-demographic
characteristics like gender, age, household income and education of the parents.
To summarize, the outcome variables are recycling levels of subjects and their
willingness to pay for different pro-environment behaviours. Control variables include
pre-treatment environment score of subjects that captures attitudes and beliefs towards
environment, environmental norms among peers in classrooms, and demographic
characteristics collected through surveys. Figure 1.2 represents the timeline of the study
and the order in which data is collected.
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Figure 1.2: Timeline of the data collection
Feb 2019 Set up of recycling facility (recycling data collected monthly)
Mar 2019
Apr 2019 Summer holidays
May 2019 Summer holidays
Jun 2019




Nov 2019 Pre-intervention Lottery task to elicit the WTPs
Dec 2019 Start of the interventions. Schools are divided into INFO
treatment, INFO + INC treatment and the control.
Jan 2020
Feb 2020 Post - intervention Lottery task and endline survey on
environment attitudes
1.3 Hypotheses
This study measures the effect of the interventions (INFO and INFO + INC) on the level
of single-use plastic recycling and on the WTP for different pro-environment behaviours.
The first goal is to check if the treatments succeed in changing the recycling behaviours of
the students. I use a difference-in-difference estimation. This is essential because there is
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no information about the recycling behaviour of the students at the start of the study as
they do not have access to any recycling facilities. The city does not offer regular recycling
services. Therefore, baseline recycling data is collected from all schools in the sample
on baseline recycling levels before dividing the schools into control, INFO treatment
and INFO + INC treatment. This gives a difference-in-difference setting where we can
measure if the difference in recycling levels pre- and post- intervention of a treatment
is different from the difference in the recycling levels pre- and post- intervention in the
control group.















1.3.1 On recycling levels
As a first step, I measure if there is a difference in the change in recycling levels pre-
and post- intervention, between the three treatments. Both the treatments are aimed at
nudging the students to increase recycling levels either by providing information on the
need to recycle or providing direct incentives to recycle.
Hypothesis 1a Change in recycling level of students in the INFO treatment pre- and
post- intervention is larger than the change in recycling level of students in the Control
pre- and post- intervention.
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∆RecyclingINFO −∆RecyclingControl > 0
Hypothesis 1b Change in recycling level of students in the INFO + INC treatment
pre- and post- intervention is larger than the change in recycling level of students in the
Control pre- and post- intervention.
∆Recycling(INFO + INC) −∆RecyclingControl > 0
1.3.2 On WTP for pro-environment activities
I collect the WTP data using the lottery experiment two months before the intervention





ij , for each student i for each environment activity j in
the list of 7 activities. For the rest of the hypotheses we focus on this ∆WTPij.
If the ∆WTPij is positive, it implies that students are willing to pay more for an
environment activity j after the intervention compared to before the intervention. If this
goes hand in hand with an increase in the levels of recycling, we call these two activities
complements. Likewise, a negative ∆WTPij indicates that students have lowered their
contributions to the environment activity j. And if this happens with those who increase
their levels of recycling, we call these two activities substitutes.
We first look at the WTP for promoting plastic recycling. Here, WTP for promoting
plastic recycling and actual recycling behaviour are two different expressions of the
same underlying behaviour, and hence very close substitutes. However, we are agnostic
about the direction of spillovers between the actual recycling behaviour and the WTP
measure. Subjects who increase actual recycling as a result of the intervention, could be
contributing less to the WTP measure if they believe that they recycle enough through
their actions and think that the money is better spent elsewhere. In this case, recycling
and contributions for promoting recycling are substitutes. In other words, there is a
negative spillover from the intervention to the WTP measure. However, if the increase
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in the actual recycling levels co-exist with an increase in the WTP measure, the two
behaviours are complements (i.e., there is a positive spillover between the two).
Hypothesis 2a Change in the WTP of the subjects for recycling plastic in the INFO
treatment pre- and post- intervention is different than the change in the WTP of the





Hypothesis 2b Change in the WTP of the subjects for recycling plastic in the INFO
+ INC treatment pre- and post- intervention is different than the change in the WTP of





We now estimate the effect of the interventions on other pro-environment activities
(proxied by the WTP measure elicited in the lottery task).
Hypothesis 3a Change in the WTP of the subjects for an environment activity j in
the INFO treatment pre- and post-intervention is different to the change in the WTP for
activity j in the Control pre- and post- intervention.
∆WTPINFOij −∆WTPControlij ≷ 0
Hypothesis 3b Change in the WTP of the subjects for an environment activity j in
the INFO + INC treatment pre- and post-intervention is different to the change in the
WTP for activity j in the Control pre- and post- intervention.
∆WTP(INFO + INC)ij −∆WTPControlij ≷ 0
The direction of the change determines if the activities are substitutes of complements.
If the change in the WTP for environment activity j of the subjects in the treatments
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is larger than the change in the WTP for environment activity j of the subjects in the
Control, then the said activity and recycling plastics are complements. If the change
in the WTP for environment activity j in the treatments is smaller than the change in
the WTP for environment activity j in the Control, then the said activity and recycling
plastics are substitutes.
1.4 Data and Results
The study was conducted over the period of February 2019 - March 2020. On average,
students recycle about 0.60 carry bags before the intervention. The recycling levels before
the intervention are not statistically different in each of the three treatment groups. The
baseline averages are shown in table 1.1. On average, most students do not recycle in the
Control group even after the intervention, while in the INFO and INFO + INC treatments
recycling goes up. On average only around 3% of students recycle before the intervention
across the treatments.
Table 1.1: Average recycling and percentage of students who recycle
Pre-Intervention Post-Intervention
Control INFO (INFO + INC) Control INFO (INFO + INC)
Average items recycled 0.46 0.53 0.83 0.53 1.37 3.88
Percentage of students who recycle 3% 4% 3% 1% 3% 7%
1.4.1 On recycling levels
We estimate following difference-in-difference estimation with an OLS regression:
Yi = β0+β1ti+β2INFOi+β3(INFO + INC)i+δ1(ti.INFOi)+δ2(ti.INFO + INCi)+β4Xi+εi
The outcome variable Yi indicates the recycling levels for subject i. The variable INFOi
takes value 1 if the subject i is in INFO treatment, (INFO + INC)i takes the value 1 if
subject i is in INFO + INC treatment, ti takes the value 1 if the observation is from post
intervention, and Xi is a vector of control variables including age and gender.
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The co-efficients of interest are δ1 and δ2 and they capture the effect of being in the
treatments post the intervention. In other words, they capture the change in recycling
levels for treated schools less the change in recycling levels for control schools. Figure 1.4
shows the first main result. The figure indicates that information alone as a nudge does
not lead to a significant increase in recycling levels. The change in recycling levels before
and after the information intervention is not significantly different than the change in
recycling levels before and after intervention in the control.




















Note: The figure shows the effect of the treatments on the change in the recycling levels.
The plots show the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals obtained from
difference-in-difference estimation (specification 4 in table 1.2), regressing the outcome
variable (change in the recycling level) on the INFO * POST dummy and the (INFO +
INC)*Post dummy. The INFO * POST dummy captures the effect of being in the INFO
treatment post the intervention. Similarly, the (INFO + INC)*Post dummy captures
the effect of being in the INFO + INC treatment post the intervention.
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Result 1a: There is no significant difference between the change in recycling level of
students in the INFO treatment pre- and post- intervention compared to the the change
in recycling level of students in the control pre- and post- intervention.
However, change in the recycling levels of students who are in the INFO + INC
treatment pre- and post- intervention is 2.38 percentage points higher than the change
in the recycling levels of students in the control pre- and post- intervention. This is
significant at the 5% level. This indicates that offering incentives and information
increases recycling levels.
Result 1b: Change in recycling level of students in the INFO + INC treatment pre-
and post- intervention is larger than the change in recycling level of students in the
Control pre- and post- intervention.
Table 1.2 reports these results from the difference-in-difference regressions. The
dependent variable is the number of single-use plastic bags recycled. Column (1) of
table 1.2 is the baseline OLS estimation, column (2) presents results that are clustered
at the classroom level, column (3) adds control variables including demographics and
column (4) adds school level fixed effects.
The variables of interest are INFO*Post and (INFO + INC)*Post. INFO*Post is the
difference in difference indicator that takes the value 1 if the individual student is in the
INFO treatment post the intervention. The estimated co-efficient for INFO*Post variable
equals 1.09 and is significant at the 1% level (column (1)). This indicates that the change
in recycling level pre- and post- intervention in the INFO treatment is 1.09 percentage
points larger than the change in recycling levels pre- and post- intervention in the control
schools. However, clustering the standard errors at the classroom level (presented in
column (2)) makes the effects insignificant. Additional control variables such as age and
gender of students are added in the regression estimates presented in column (3) and
school level Fixed Effects are added in column (4), none of which qualitatively change
the results.
The variable (INFO + INC) * Post captures the effect of an individual student being in
the INFO + INC treatment post the intervention. Column (1) of table 1.2 indicates that
18
it has an estimated co-efficient of 3.19 which is significant at the 1% level. The change
in recycling levels pre- and post- intervention in the INFO + INC treatment is 3.19
percentage points larger than the change in recycling levels pre- and post- intervention in
the control schools. I cluster standard errors at the classroom level (grade-by-division-by-
school) in columns (2) to (4) in table 1.2. In columns (3) and (4) demographic controls
like age and gender of the students are added. Girls are 1.51 percentage points more
likely to recycle and younger students are 2.84 percentage points more likely to recycle.
Adding control variables and clustering the standard errors gives a revised co-efficient of
2.38 significant at the 5%. Additionally in column (4) I add school level fixed effects to
the estimation. Adding school level FE does not further change the results.
Discussion on the assumptions for difference-in-difference estimation. It is
important for the difference-in-difference estimation that the co-efficients of the terms
INFO and INFO + INC are not significant. It is noteworthy that there is no significant
difference in recycling levels between the two treatment groups and the control in my
sample before the intervention kicks in. In fact, the recycling levels before the intervention
of the treatments is statistically no different from zero. There are more periods pre-
intervention than post-intervention in the data to credibly establish these parallel trends
(as is a recommended best practice).
Moreover, I can credibly establish that the two treatments and control are similar
not just in the levels of recycling but also in trends in recycling before the intervention.
Figure 1.5 shows the graph plotting the average number of plastic carry bags recycled in
the INFO treatment, INFO + INC treatment and the control group over time. The graph
indicates that the average number of carry bags recycled is the same across treatment
groups before the intervention.
Additionally, there are no spillover effects between the treatment and the control
groups, as the randomization happens at the school level and thus, treatment schools
are different from control schools. The whole data collection process lasted one school
year and students did not drop out of one school and join another in my sample. The
control variables like age and demographics are also orthogonal to the treatment
interventions.
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Table 1.2: Effect of treatments on recycling levels
Number of single-use plastic bags recycled
Specification: DID
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INFO * Post 1.094*** 1.094 1.341 1.295
(Diff-in-Diff) (0.325) (0.759) (1.049) (1.035)
(INFO + INC) * Post 3.195*** 3.195*** 2.425** 2.388**
(Diff-in-Diff) (0.500) (1.155) (1.145) (1.135)
Post -0.966*** -0.966 -0.943 -0.947
(0.188) (0.587) (0.826) (0.826)
INFO -0.256 -0.256 -0.807 -0.873
(0.191) (0.663) (0.990) (0.995)
INFO + INC 0.150 0.150 0.271 0.534
(0.190) (0.600) (0.801) (0.729)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Clustering No Yes Yes Yes
School FE No No No Yes
Constant 1.497*** 1.497*** 25.90*** 25.69***
(0.164) (0.553) (7.577) (7.468)
No. of Obs. 26050 26050 14118 14118
R-Squared 0.00493 0.00493 0.0129 0.0133
Note: Dependent variable in this estimation is the number of single use plastic bags that an
individual student brings to recycle. INFO * Post and (INFO + INC) * Post are the Diff-in-diff
variables of interest. They capture the effect of being in the respective treatments post the
intervention. The variable post takes value 1 if the period is after intervention and 0 if period
is before intervention. INFO indicates schools that are in the information treatment. The co-
efficients for INFO is not statistically significant in the estimations indicating that the treatment
is randomly distributed. Similarly, INFO+INC indicates schools that are in the information
+ incentive treatment. The co-efficients for INFO+INC is also not statistically significant.
Ordinary least squares (OLS). Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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      Intervention
Control INFO treatment INFO + INC treatment
Note: The graph shows average number of plastic carry bags recycled by students every
month. Blue dots indicate the control group, red dots indicate the INFO treatment, and
green indicates INFO + INC treatment. Before the intervention, the average recycling
levels are statistically the same in the three treatment groups and are not statistically
different from 0.
Comparisons between the INFO treatment and the INFO + INC treatment shows that
the change in recycling levels in INFO + INC treatment is significantly higher than the
change in the INFO treatment. This indicates that the incentives drive the increase in
the recycling levels. The results are presented in table 1.3. As column (3) indicates. the
change in the recycling levels of students in the (INFO + INC) treatment is positive and
is 1.66 percentage points larger than that of the INFO treatment.
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Table 1.3: Treatment difference in recycling levels
Number of single-use plastic bags recycled
Specification: DID
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline: INFO treatment
(INFO + INC) * Post 2.101*** 2.675** 1.660* 1.649*
(0.533) (1.067) (0.853) (0.851)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Clustering No Yes Yes Yes
School FE No No No Yes
No. of Obs. 17412 26050 14118 14118
R-Squared 0.00528 0.00466 0.0124 0.0128
Note: This table presents estimations using data from only the INFO treatment and
(INFO + INC) treatment. Dependent variable in this estimation is the number of
single use plastic bags that an individual student brings to recycle. (INFO + INC) *
Post is the Diff-in-diff variables of interest. Ordinary least squares (OLS). Standard
errors are clustered at the classroom level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The preceding analysis focused on the change in the number of carry bags that students
recycle due to the interventions. An equally useful analysis is to look at the decision
to recycle or not as a binary variable. The following analysis checks whether students
participate in recycling or not and if their decision to participate is influenced by the
treatment. As indicated in table 1.1 there is an increase in the number of students who
recycle in the INFO + INC treatment post- intervention compared to pre- intervention.
However these effects are not significant in the difference-in-difference estimation. Table
1.4 presents the estimation results. The analysis shows that neither of the treatments
has an effect on the students’ decision to participate in recycling. A closer look into
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the recycling also shows that, the effects we identify in Result 1b are driven by a subset
of “super-recycler” students (roughly 10% of the total population) who increase their
recycling levels substantially in the INFO + INC treatment. Almost all the effect works
through the intensive margin, where individuals who already brought some (albeit, very
few) plastic items to recycle, after the intervention, significantly raise their recycling
levels. There is no significant change in the remaining 90% of students who belong in the
INFO + INC treatment.
Table 1.4: Effect of treatments on the decision to recycle
Decision to recycle
Specification: DID
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INFO * Post 0.0196*** 0.0196 0.0317 0.0311
(0.00705) (0.0198) (0.0225) (0.0228)
(INFO + INC) * POST 0.00436 0.00436 -0.0126 -0.0130
(0.00788) (0.0220) (0.0226) (0.0227)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Clustering No Yes Yes Yes
School FE No No No Yes
No. of Obs. 17412 26050 14118 14118
R-Squared 0.00528 0.00466 0.0124 0.0128
Note: Dependent variable in this estimation is a binary variable that captures the
student’s decision to recycle or not. It takes value 1 if the student recycles and
0 otherwise. LPM. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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1.4.2 On WTP for recycling plastics
In this section I estimate the spillovers from the treatments to other environment
behaviours as measured by the WTP for different activities in the lottery task. The
spillover effects from treatment intervention to the WTPs are measured by checking the
difference between pre- and post- WTP for an individual student i for each environment
activity j (∆WTP(i,j)) and if this difference varies systematically across treatments.
The average WTP for each of the different activities before the intervention are shown
in figure 1.6. The pre-intervention WTP ranges between 7.30 INR for promoting public
transport to 19.50 INR for planting trees. Table 1.5 presents the average WTP for each
of the activities across treatments before and after the interventions.
Table 1.5: Average WTP contributions (in INR)
Pre-Intervention Post-Intervention
Control INFO (INFO + INC) Control INFO (INFO + INC)
Average contribution to WTP
Recycle plastics 11.49 13.09 11.00 9.98 12.16 12.87
Recycle paper 8.41 9.37 7.62 8.04 9.30 10.03
Plant trees 19.61 22.25 18.24 15.59 16.85 18.95
Reduce air pollution 11.74 11.80 8.99 10.25 11.10 11.29
Reduce water pollution 12.34 12.46 11.24 11.46 11.88 12.87
Promote public transport 7.32 8.09 6.57 7.38 8.78 8.25
Save wildlife 13.24 12.62 11.47 11.07 12.28 12.32
Figure 1.7 graphically shows how the change in WTP for each activity varies across
the three treatments. For those students in the control, the WTP for every activity is
lower in the post-intervention period compared to the pre-intervention. For those in the
INFO treatment the WTP is also lower (or the same) for all the activities, but not as
low as in the case of the Control. However, in the (INFO + INC) treatment, there is an
increase in the WTP in the post intervention period. This increase is significant at the
95% level for all activities other than saving wildlife.
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Recycle plastic Recycle paper Plant trees
Reduce air pollution Reduce water pollution Promote public transport
Save wildlife
Note: The graph shows the willingness to pay for each of the environment activity
before the interventions. This data is collected from the lottery task. The highest
pre-intervention WTP is observed for planting trees (19.50 INR) and the lowest is seen
for promoting public transport (7.30 INR)
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Control INFO INFO + INC
Save wildlife
Note: The figures indicate the change in the WTP (Post-intervention WTP − Pre-intervention WTP)
26
Figure 1.8 shows the effect of being in the INFO treatment on the change in WTP.
The change in the WTP for each activity j pre- and post- intervention is not significantly
different from 0, except for promoting efforts to save wildlife which sees an increase of
2.4 percentage points. There is no change in the other 6 environment activities. This
indicates that students in this treatment on average contribute more or less the same in
the pre-intervention and post-intervention lottery tasks and the difference between the
contributions is not significantly different from those who are in the control schools. This
finding is consistent with the earlier result that INFO treatment alone does not lead to
an increase in recycling levels.
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Recycle Plastics Recycle Paper Plant Trees
Reduce air pollution Reduce water pollution Promote public transport
Save wildlife
INFO treatment
Note: The figure shows the effect of the INFO treatment on the change in WTP for
different environment activities. The plots show the coefficient estimates and 95%
confidence intervals obtained from regressing the outcome variable (change in the WTP)
on INFO treatment dummy. Coefficients are obtained from the regression estimation
clustered at the classroom level, with all the control variables (same specification in
table 1.6). Y-axis displays the outcome variable. The horizontal line at zero represents
the control group. Here, the plots indicate that the change in WTP for environment
actions of the students in the INFO treatment is not statistically different from that of
the control, except in the case of saving wildlife.
INFO + INC treatment, on the other hand, spills over positively into all the seven
environment activities. This indicates that students in this treatment on average
contribute more in the post-intervention lottery task compared to the pre-intervention
lottery task. Figure 1.9 shows that the change in WTPs for every activity j is positive
and significantly different from 0 for the students in the INFO + INC treatment.
28














Recycle Plastics Recycle Paper Plant Trees
Reduce air pollution Reduce water pollution Promote public transport
Save wildlife
INFO + INC treatment
Note: The figure shows the effect of the INFO + INC treatment on the change in
WTP for different environment activities. The plots show the coefficient estimates
and 95% confidence intervals obtained from regressing the outcome variable (change
in the WTP) on INFO + INC treatment dummy. Coefficients are obtained from the
regression estimation clustered at the classroom level, with all the control variables
(same specification in table 1.6). Y-axis displays the outcome variable. The horizontal
line at zero represents the control group. Here, the plots indicate that students in the
INFO + INC treatment have a positive and statistically significant change in the WTP
for every environment action compared to the control. This indicates that students in
this treatment increase their WTP for every environment action.
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Table 1.6: WTP for different environment activities















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline: Control group
INFO treatment 0.982 0.647 0.280 1.044 0.891 0.890 2.402**
(0.882) (0.817) (1.097) (0.891) (0.978) (0.782) (0.981)
INFO + INC treatment 3.587*** 2.854*** 6.255*** 3.980*** 2.693*** 1.711** 3.231***
(0.886) (0.830) (1.129) (0.872) (0.975) (0.766) (0.958)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 3255 3252 3254 3252 3255 3249 3254
Note: Dependent variable in this estimation the change in WTP for each of the environmental
activities. Ordinary least squares (OLS). Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The regression results presented in table 1.6 confirm this finding. From the last section,
we know that the INFO treatment does not change the recycling behaviour of students.
Consistent with that, there is no change in the WTP for the environment activities for
those students in the INFO treatment. The co-efficients are small and not statistically
significant. The only exception is the 2.4 percentage point increase in contributions to
saving wildlife, significant at the 5% level.
In contrast, those in the INFO + INC treatment considerably increase their
contributions to every environment activity. The effect is highly significant (p < 0.01).
There is a 3.58 pp increase in contributions to promoting plastic recycling, 2.85 pp
increase in case of promoting paper recycling, 6.25 pp increase in planting trees, 3.98 pp
increase in promoting reduction of air pollution, 2.69 pp increase in promoting
reduction of water pollution, 1.71 pp increase in promoting public transport and 3.23 pp
increase in contributions to saving wildlife. This analysis implies that when the
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intervention is strong enough to induce a change in recycling behaviour, it spills over
positively into the other dimensions of environment behaviours that we measure.
1.5 Mechanisms
In this section, I analyse, in detail, some of the mechanisms that possibly drive the effect
of the treatments as well as the spillover effects.
1.5.1 Environment attitudes and awareness
One of the results from the earlier section is that the INFO treatment does not have
an effect in increasing the recycling levels, whereas the INFO + INC treatment has a
significant positive effect. This implies that providing information alone does not affect
the behaviour. One of the possible reasons for this is that the levels of awareness about
environmental issues and the need for recycling could already be quite high in the baseline,
i.e., before any intervention. This would imply that individuals do not recycle not because
they don’t know that it is important to recycle, but for other reasons.
I check this using the data collected using the environment attitudes and awareness
survey. The intrinsic link between environment attitudes and subsequent environment
behaviours have been extensively documented (Gardner and Stern (1996), Hines et al.
(1987)). The underlying principle is that those individuals who exhibit
pro-environmental attitudes are more likely to engage in such behaviours, whether they
are self-reported or observed. Hence measuring an individual’s concern towards the
environment is an essential first step in understanding pro-environment behaviours. The
New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale developed by Dunlap and Van Liere (1978)
is the most frequently used tool to measure attitudes towards the environment. I adapt
the NEP survey along two dimensions. First, the survey is made age appropriate to suit
young adolescents. Second, it is modified to fit the socio-cultural scenario of Kerala and
its local environmental issues.
The survey covers beliefs and attitudes that the students have towards the quality of the
environment, human actions and its consequences on the environment, and whether they
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think that they can engage in activities that can improve the quality of the environment.
The responses are made into an environment score – a higher score implies a higher
awareness about the environmental issues and a positive attitude about contributing to
improving environment quality. The survey is ran in June 2019, five months before the
intervention, to collect baseline information on the awareness levels. Three months after
the intervention, a simplified, yet similar survey is run among the students to get the
post-intervention environmental score. The detailed survey design is in the appendix.
The main finding from the pre-intervention baseline survey is that majority of the
respondents in our sample are aware about the threats due to environmental issues and
exhibit a concern towards the environment. Figure 1.10 shows the graph plotting pre-
intervention environment scores of students. The x-axis plots the environment scores
and the y-axis indicates the percentage of respondents with the corresponding score.
The figure illustrates that, students on average score on the top quartile of environment
scores. This implies that students on average are highly aware about the issues regarding
environment quality, suggesting that INFO treatment probably did not do anything to
raise awareness levels.
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Environment attitudes and awareness score
Note: The graph shows the distribution of environment scores among the students.
Environment scores are computed using survey data collected at the start of the study.
Data is collected several months before the interventions are introduced. The survey
is modelled along the New Environment Paradigm scores, and captures attitudes and
awareness levels of the students towards environmental quality and the need to improve
it.
1.5.2 Sources of spillovers
Behavioural (dis)similarity Truelove et al. (2014) claims that positive spillovers
could be observed between environment activities that are behaviourally similar to each
other and negative spillovers could be observed between those that are behaviourally
dissimilar. Margetts and Kashima (2017) suggests two mechanisms behind spill overs
between environment actions. A positive spillover is likely to occur (1) when the two
behaviours complement each other in contributing to the final environmental goal and
(2) when they use same type of resources. Thøgersen and Ölander (2003) reported that
pro-environment behaviours within the same taxonomic categories (i.e., behaviours
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similar in terms of the time and place of their performance, the resources employed,
etc.) are more likely to be complements. Cornelissen et al. (2008) finds that when
individuals are informed that different behaviours contribute to the final goal, more
positive spillovers are observed.
The lottery task helps control for behavioural similarity and dissimilarity theories as
explanations for substitutability or complementarity. There are different dimensions along
which behaviours are similar or dissimilar. Similarity could be in terms of time and place
of their action, or the resources required to do it or the type of the inherent activity itself.
The list of activities that are used in the task neatly classify into behaviours that are
relatively similar to recycle of single-use plastics (e.g. recycling paper) and those that
are relatively dissimilar (e.g. planting trees). Our results indicate a consistent positive
spillover from recycling plastic bags to WTP for different environment causes. These two
however, are not behaviourally similar in terms of time or place of action or the resources
required to do it. Moreover, the complementarity is observed between recycling and a
wide array of environmental causes. However, it is to be kept in mind that the inherent
activity in the lottery game could be simplified as a contribution to different causes. In
this way, we are capturing spillovers between recycling and willingness to contribute to a
pro-environmental cause.
Peer effects and social norms Individual actions are also influenced by the peer
group and the change in behaviour could just be a reflection of changes in the peer
norms surrounding environment activities in general and recycling in particular. This
applies both in case of positive or negative spillover, depending on the direction of the
norm change. More specifically, if the treatments change recycling behaviour, that could
in turn change the social norms in the classrooms, not just on recycling, but also on
environment actions in general. I elicit (non-incentivized) perceived classroom norms
on recycling of single-use plastics and other environment activities (namely, littering,
switching off electrical appliances after use including lights and fans, and use of single-
use plastic cups and plates) among the peer groups using Krupke-Weber norm elicitation
method (Krupka and Weber (2013)). The questionnaire for norm elicitation is also in the
appendix.
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I find no significant differences in norms regarding environment activities pre- and
post- intervention across the treatments. However, across treatments, those students
who recycle consistently, tend to believe, albeit mistakenly, that most of their peers also
recycle (and act pro-environmentally in terms of not littering, switching off electrical
appliances after use, and not using single-use plastic cups and plates).
Salience The interventions focus primarily on the recycling of single-use carry bags.
Recycling is made very salient, and an increased salience of recycling could lead to
students focusing all their energy on that in the lottery task at the expense of other
pro-environment behaviours. However, the results do not indicate that students
disproportionately favouring recycling of plastic or recycling of paper in the lottery task.
Intrinsic motivation and general pro-environment behavior Complementarity
between recycling of single-use plastics and other environment activities could be an
artifact of intrinsic motivation towards pro-environment activities. Intrinsic motivation
is controlled through a composite measure of environment attitudes, beliefs and activities
(details are presented in the appendix). A concern about social approval among subjects
could also lead to an increase in several (or all) pro-environment behaviours. We control
for this using the Marlowe-Crowne scale.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I use a field experiment to study the effects of two interventions aimed
at increasing recycling levels on non-target environment behaviours. The objective is to
measure if doing one pro-environment behaviour spills over positively or negatively into
other environment behaviours. The paper brings together evidence from a randomized
control trial, a lab experiment, administrative and survey data.
There are three major findings. Firstly, interventions in the form of information
provision do not change recycling behaviour of the students. Secondly, providing
incentives in addition to the information provision causes an increase in the recycling
levels. Thirdly, there is a positive spillover from the incentive intervention to other
environment behaviours. This indicates that the treatment resulted in increased
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recycling as well as an increase in the students’ willingness to pay for different
environment activities, captured through a lab experiment. This indicates there are




1.7.1 Appendix A1 - Posters for classrooms











1.7.2 Appendix A2 - Elicitation of the Willingness To Pay









In case you win, do you want to give any money 
to any of the following activities?
Note: This is the template used to elicit the WTP for each of the activities before and
after intervention.
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1.7.3 Appendix B1 - Survey on environmental attitudes and
behaviour
Hello and Welcome! Please take a few minutes to fill the survey.
The data collected are for the sole purpose of scientific enquiry and will not be disclosed
to third parties. Your participation in this research is voluntary. You are free to leave
the survey anytime you wish so.
Please tick I AGREE to begin the survey.















Not at all worried




Not at all worried
2. Here are some statements about people and the environment. For each statement,
please indicate whether you: strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
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2.1 We are reaching the limit of the number of people








































2.8 It worries me when I think about the environmental






3. Please tick the actions you do at
your household.
Recycle newspapers/ other paper waste
Recycle plastic waste
Rainwater harvesting
Separating recyclable waste at home
Use solar panels/ heater
Make compost from waste
5. Do you do any of the following?
5.1 Turn off all electrical appliances if I leave a room.
Yes
No
5.2 Use hot water for showers.
Yes
No
5.3 Use public transport/ shared transport/ school bus
to come to school.
Yes
No
5.4 Completely shut off electrical equipment and do not
leave it in stand-by mode.
Yes
No
5.5 Participate in environment friendly activities.
Yes
No
6. Right now, do you think that you should act to













1.7.4 Appendix B2 - Survey data analysis
Most adolescents in India receive some form of environmental education in classrooms,
either as a separate subject or as part of the general science curricula. However, other
than being able to answer factual questions in the exam, whether this develops as a
concern for environment is up for debate. While there is a well-established literature on
the environmental attitudes among adults there are fewer studies among the youth, and
none in the Indian context. Studies have shown that while really young children have an
anthropocentric reasoning of the world, by around 11 years children develop an awareness
about the potential of human actions to have negative effects on the environment (Evans
et al. (2007)). In this survey we focus on the age group 13 - 14 years.
The New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale developed by Dunlap and Van Liere
(1978) is the most frequently used tool measure attitudes towards the environment. This
survey is modelled along the lines of the NEP scale. However, the questions are adapted
along two dimensions – (1) they are modified to fit the socio-cultural and environmental
issues of Kerala and (2) they are modified to be age appropriate (for a detailed discussion
on the adapting survey measures for younger participants, see Evans (2019)). Most of
the survey is measured in a Likert scale, where participants are asked to what degree
they agree (or disagree) with each statement, and the different environmental activities
they engage in.
The survey is divided into the following three distinct categories.
Environmental Beliefs
The objective of this section to measure the fundamental worldview that an individual
shares about the environment and the human relationship with it. The focus is on gauging
the opinions on human actions and consequences, human domination over nature and
future consequences.
Broadly, majority of the respondents in the sample exhibit a concern towards the
environment (figure 1.14). 82% of the respondent are in agreement (i.e. they say strongly
agree or agree) that when humans interfere with nature it produces great damage and
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77% agrees that we are reaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support.
Likewise, support is high for plants and animals having the same rights as humans to exist
(93%). Most of the respondents (84%) state that they worry about the environmental
conditions in which they probably have to live in the future while 92% believes that they
can protect the environment through our actions. However, 50% of the respondents do
say that humans deserve more natural resources than other species.
Figure 1.14: Environment attitudes survey: Beliefs about the environment
Note: The graph shows the degree to which students agree with the given statements.
Environmental Attitudes
Figure 1.15 describes how concerned the respondents are about (i) the environment, (ii)
climate change, (iii) pollution, and (iv) water sources running out. Most of the students
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respond either with ‘very worried’ or ‘somewhat worried’ to all four cases indicating a
concern about the environment. In case of the environment 52% of the students are very
worried and 29% are somewhat worried. On climate change 44% are very worried and 34%
are somewhat worried. Pollution causes the most concern among the respondents with
67% very worried and 22% somewhat worried. In case of water resources running out 63%
are very worried and 25% are somewhat worried. We also asked the students whether
they think that right now they should act to improve the quality of the environment
around you. 93% of the respondents reply yes, indicating very high awareness levels
about the need to act to improve the environmental quality and the importance of doing
it themselves.
Figure 1.15: Environment attitudes survey: Concern towards the environment
52% 29%
0 20 40 60 80 100
Share of respondents (%)
How worried are you about the environment?
Very worried Somewhat worried
Not so worried Not at all worried
44% 34%
0 20 40 60 80 100
Share of respondents (%)
How worried are you about climate change?
Very worried Somewhat worried
Not so worried Not at all worried
67% 22%
0 20 40 60 80 100
Share of respondents (%)
How worried are you about pollution?
Very worried Somewhat worried
Not so worried Not at all worried
63% 25%
0 20 40 60 80 100
Share of respondents (%)
How worried are you about water sources running out?
Very worried Somewhat worried
Not so worried Not at all worried
Note: The graph represents how concerned the respondents are about the environment, climate
change, pollution, and water sources running out.
Environmental Behaviours
We now look at the environmental activities done at home. This is merely indicative of
the different activities that the individual student does without saying anything about
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whether they have any decision power to do or not do them as their parents or other
members of the household could be the decision makers. As figure 1.16 shows most
commonly done activities are recycling paper (26.10% of respondents do this) and
separating recyclable waste at home (18.56%) and recycling plastic waste (18.35%).

































Recycle paper Recycle plastic
Rainwater harvesting Separate waste at home
Use solar panels/heaters Make compost
Note: The graph shows the share of students engaged in each of the listed environment
activities.
Figure 1.17 shows the response rates to some specific everyday activities. 91% of the
respondents state that they turn off all electrical appliances while leaving room. Only
34% uses public or shared transport. This item needs to be interpreted with more nuance,
as using public transport is also an issue of safety and environmental concerns are not
usually the priority when deciding the mode of transportation. 78% of the respondents
always shut down electrical equipment and 76% state that they participate in environment
friendly activities.
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Figure 1.17: Environment attitudes survey: Self reported activities
91% 9%
0 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Share of respondents (%)
I turn off all electrical appliances if I leave a room
Yes No
34% 66%
0 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Share of respondents (%)
I use public transport/school bus to come to school.
Yes No
78% 22%
0 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Share of respondents (%)
Yes No
76% 24%
0 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Share of respondents (%)
Yes No
I participate in environment friendly activities.
I fully shut down electrical equipment,
not leave in stand-by mode
Note: The graph shows the share of respondents who engage in each of the listed activities.
Socio-demographic features
Among the respondents 1,567 students identify as female. Girls score on average 2.2
percentage points higher. We also collect data on household income and higher income
is also correlated with higher pro-environment score. A part of this is driven by
students from richer households engaging in more environmental actions at home, but is
not entirely explained by it. Students with higher household income also exhibit more
pro-environmentality in beliefs and attitudes consistent with existing literature.
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1.7.5 Appendix B3 - Environment norm elicitation questionnaire
Questions on self-behaviour:
1. Do you dispose garbage in a public place?
Yes
No




3. Do you recycle plastic wastes?
Yes
No
4. Do you use disposable plastic cups and plates?
Yes
No
Questions on peer behaviour:
According to you, how many of your classmates do the following:
5. Throw garbage in a public place.
Almost all of my classmates
Some of my classmates
Not a lot of my classmates
None of my classmates
6. Leave lights and fan on when they leave
the room
Almost all of my classmates
Some of my classmates
Not a lot of my classmates
None of my classmates
7. Recycle waste
Almost all of my classmates
Some of my classmates
Not a lot of my classmates
None of my classmates
8. Use plastic cups/plates
Almost all of my classmates
Some of my classmates
Not a lot of my classmates
None of my classmates
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1.7.6 Appendix B4 - Social desirability score elicitation
I use the following questions based on the questionnaire developed by Crowne and
Marlowe (1960) and Reynolds (1982) to compute the social desirability score for every
student. For each question, students state whether they agree or disagree. The score is
computed by adding up the socially desirable answers. A higher score indicates that the
respondent is more likely to give socially desirable responses.
1. I am always polite, even to people who are disagreeable
2. I sometimes feel angry when I don’t get the things I want.
3. I am always willing to admit it when I make a mistake
4. I was jealous of the good fortune of others in the past




Why do we vote? Evidence on expressive voting.
2.1 Introduction
Why do people vote? Traditional theories of voting do not predict the turnout that we see
in elections. Downs (1957) in his seminal contribution argued that a rational individual
will abstain from voting because of the very low chance that her vote will change the
outcome of the election. Given that the probability of an individual vote changing the
outcome is very low and cost of voting is non-zero, why do we see the turnout that we
see? The answer is that voters have reasons other than ‘changing the outcome’ (the
instrumental motive) to go to the polls. The act of voting is meaningful in itself to
individuals irrespective of the outcome of the election and their role in bringing about
the said outcome. This type of voting behaviour is called expressive voting (Brennan and
Buchanan (1984), Brennan and Hamlin (1998), Hillman (2010)).
This paper provides an overview of the different sources of expressive voting motives
and quantifies their relative importance. We also measure how these expressive motives to
vote are correlated with other dimensions of political expressiveness. The paper presents
the results of a survey done using Amazon Mechanical Turk during April 2019. We
classify respondents into expressive and non-expressive voters based on whether they say
they will vote even if they know that they cannot change the election outcome. We then
ask the expressive voters why they vote.
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Respondents state that they value being part of the democratic process and it is one of
the major reasons that take them to polls. Many respondents also state that they cannot
complain about the elected candidates or the state of the government if they did not
go to the polls themselves. Among racial minorities, a frequently expressed sentiment is
that voting is a hard earned right that was denied to earlier generations. This is stated
as one of the reasons that guides them to vote. The results also shed light into how these
preferences relate to other expressive behaviours and possible political and non-political
activities. Expressive voting is positively and significantly correlated to other dimensions
of expressive behaviours like participating in protests, donating to political parties, and
even posting political opinion online.
There is extensive literature on why individuals turn out to vote despite the low chances
of affecting the election outcome. Most of it relates to the intrinsic value that the act
of voting holds, separate from the outcome of voting. The most frequently highlighted
reason is that voting is civic duty (Riker and Ordeshook (1968)). In public narratives,
participating in the democratic process is the duty of a ‘good citizen’ and most individuals
receive a positive utility from being one. Buchanan (1954) introduced the significance of
a non-standard rational to voting, a line of reasoning leading to the theories of expressive
voting, where individuals derive utility by expressing their preference (Tullock (1971),
Fiorina (1976) Brennan and Buchanan (1984)).
Individuals often vote because it is the desired social norm and they receive a positive
utility by signaling this to themselves and others. Gerber et al. (2008) ran large scale
field experiments to find a significant increase in voter turnout when the voters received
mails that promised to publicize their turnout to neighbors. Along similar lines,
DellaVigna et al. (2016) finds evidence for social image concerns that take individuals
to the polls. These concerns stem from individuals taking pride in telling others that
they voted or feeling shame in telling others that they did not. Voting is often a way to
signal one’s values and identity to one self even in the absence of a social group
(Hillman (2010)). Bryan et al. (2011) finds that using linguistic cues that emphasize
self-perceptions increased interest in registering to vote. Additionally theories on
procedural utility proposed by Frey et al. (2004) suggests that voters derive utility not
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only from the outcome of their actions, but also in performing the action. Participation
in elections could be valuable in itself because it gives utility from a feeling of
self-determination and influence. People also turn out to partake in election events,
festivities and celebration, as an outing, and to be part of the community according to
Addonizio et al. (2007). This goes hand in hand to the way elections are covered in
media drawing parallels to a competition or a sports event.
Once voters are at the polling booth, they still have to choose between the different
options on the ballot. Expressing gratitude or dissatisfaction to a particular candidate
can aid the decision between the different options available (Fiorina (1976), Brennan and
Buchanan (1984)). Other reasons such as joy of supporting the winning team, bandwagon
effects, underdog effects, protest vote, etc., have been identified as reasons to choose
between the available options on the ballot (Simon (1954)).
Expressive voting is often presented in contrast to instrumental voting where a voter
votes to bring about a particular outcome. Brennan and Lomasky (1997) introduced
the low cost theory of expressive voting where individuals trade off the instrumental and
expressive motives. In this theory, the expressive motives become relevant when the
instrumental reasons to vote start to wane due to low probability of being pivotal in the
election outcome. Tyran (2004) presents an overview of evidence for low cost theories
of expressive voting from laboratory experiments. One of the challenges in disentangling
expressive and instrumental motives is that they coincide with each other, more often
than not. Johnson et al. (1975), for example, argued that expressiveness is not the
opposite of instrumentality but a separate independent dimension.
Voting is one of the main manifestations of political expressiveness but often is not
the only one. Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) look at why people participate
in protests, which is another form of political expressiveness albeit with possibly higher
costs. Self and social image considerations and ideological reasons are significant in
leading people to protests. A sense of efficacy and belief in causing change contributes to
protest participation. Other dimensions include signing petitions, putting up lawn signs,
and donating to political parties. Copeland and Laband (2002) find positive correlation
between donating to the US Federal Election Commission and the propensity to vote.
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The widespread use of social media offers another low cost option of posting political
opinions online. Each of these vary in their costs and have different end goals, which
are not necessarily aimed at getting the political party/candidate you support to win.
However, each of these are potentially correlated with voting in general, and expressive
voting in particular.
This paper contributes to the literature by building a comprehensive portfolio of the
expressive voting motives and quantifying their relative importance. The paper also
provides evidence on how expressive voting correlates with various measures of political
expressiveness and civic responsibility. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the
next section covers the survey design, section 2.3 presents the results and section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 Survey Design
Participants The data for the study was collected using an internet survey of a sample
of 2,000 individuals. The survey was administered using Amazon Mechanical Turk during
April 2019 and the participants were compensated at a flat rate for participation. All
the respondents were from the US. The questionnaire was designed and implemented
using Qualtrics. The study was approved by the Ethics committee of the Department of
Economics, at the University of Munich in 2018.
Questionnaire The survey questionnaire was organized into the following three groups
to capture the factors that affect expressive voting behaviour.
1. Expressive voting motives
2. Political expressiveness
3. Demography and individual political preferences
Expressive voting motives Most voters are driven by a desire to change the election
results whereas some turn out because they over-estimate their probability of changing
the outcome. To distinguish these voters from those who turn out due to expressive
reasons, we ask the respondents if they will go to vote if the anticipated election result is
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very clear and that they know their vote will not change the outcome. The respondents
who say ‘yes’ to the above question are classified as expressive voters. The respondents
who say “maybe” or “no” are classified as non-expressive voters. The main exploratory
analysis focuses on the different motivations individuals have in voting when they know
that their individual votes do not change the outcome. Existing literature has made
excellent progress in identifying many motives to vote expressively. We include the most
significant ones in subsequent follow up questions to understand the different relative
importance of one motivation over the others. We also added an open-ended question in
the end where respondents can tell us their reason to go to the polls.
Going to the polls is often characterized as a responsibility of a ‘good citizen’.
Individuals try to project themselves as ‘good citizens’ to themselves and to others
albeit to varying degrees. While being a good citizen involves voting, it is not the only
activity that falls under it. Interpretations of civic duty also involve following rules and
laws and paying taxes (Frey (1997a), Frey (1997b), Orviska and Hudson (2003)). We
aim to use the variation in the degree to which individuals value other expressions of
being a good citizen. We collect data on respondents attitudes towards paying taxes,
following traffic rules, and other dimensions of civic duty.
Political expressiveness Brennan and Lomasky (1997) famously compared voting to
cheering for a sports team. Voting in this context is an expression of support. Political
expressive behaviours are not limited to voting alone. Taking to the streets to protest
or strike or sharing political opinions on social media fall under the larger umbrella
of expressive behaviour. We identified a list of such activities that vary in costs that
are correlated with voting behaviour. However, we remain agnostic on the direction of
relationship between these actions and voting. The list includes donations to any political
parties, participation in strike, protest, march, or demonstrations, writing / calling /
getting in touch with elected representatives / public officials, signing a petition, posting
/ sharing a political opinion on Facebook / Twitter / other social media platform and
boycotting or buying a product for ethical reasons.
Memberships in social or political groups as well as organizational affiliations are also
indicative of expressive behaviours. We collect data on membership in different kinds
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of groups or associations including political parties, trade unions, and professional or
religious affiliation.
Demography and individual political preferences The control variables
collected in this survey include age, race, gender, education, income, orientation in
left-right political spectrum, whether individuals identified as Republican or Democrat
and whether they were registered with either of the parties. The survey also included
questions on whether the individuals agreed with the statements ‘going to vote is a lot
of effort’ and ‘citizens have the right not to vote’. We also asked how strongly they held
their ethical views and if they knew whether their parents voted (and if they did, for
which political party/candidate they voted). The full survey questionnaire can be found
in the appendix.
2.3 Results
The survey was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk and was answered by 2000
individuals in the United States. The respondents received a small flat payment for
their time. 49% of the respondents identified as women and 84% as white. Table 2.1
presents the descriptive statistics.
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African American 129 6.4
Asian American 112 5.5
Others 92 4.61




No preference 49 2.43
Other 36 1.78
Notes: Table based on 2,000 survey respondents.
2.3.1 Main expressive voting motives
Our analysis focuses mainly on those individuals who state that they would vote even if
they knew for sure that their vote will not change the outcome. Subject who vote ‘yes’
to the following question are considered as expressive voters for the rest of the analysis.
Suppose the anticipated electoral outcome is very clear and you expect that your vote
will not be decisive in that outcome. Would you still go to vote?
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Figure 2.2 presents the result. 78% of the respondents are expressive voters and 22%
respond with ‘maybe’. None of the respondents say ‘no’ to this question despite the
survey being anonymous. This points to strong social norms and expectations regarding
turning out to vote. Of course, this is different to the actual turnout as it is costlier than
clicking a button. However, rather than the percentage of people who state they would
turn out, we focus on the different expressive motives and their relative importance in
the minds of those who vote despite being non-pivotal in the outcome.


























Would you vote if it was certain that your vote will not be decisive in the election outcome?
Note: The figure shows the share of respondents who state they would vote even if they cannot
change the outcome. 78% of the respondents state that they would vote, 22% state ‘maybe’ and
none of the respondents state that they would not vote.
Next we turn to identifying the relative importance of various expressive motives. We
ask the follow up questions to those respondents who state they would vote despite not
being able to change the outcome. Respondents answer on a four point Likert scale how
important the below reasons are for them in their decision to go to the polls. The order
in which these reasons were presented to the respondents were randomized (here they are
displayed in the order in which it appears in figure 2.2.
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1. I vote because I would like to be part of the democratic process.
2. I know that my single vote is very unlikely to make a difference. But if everyone
thinks like this and does not vote, it would be the end of democracy.
3. I vote to express my solidarity to the policy positions of the particular party/
candidate.
4. I want to use my vote to express gratitude for good performance or to express
dissatisfaction for bad performance of the incumbent.
5. I see voting as an act of loyalty to my party/ candidate and gives me satisfaction
to vote for my party/candidate.
6. After the elections I talk to my friends and colleagues about the elections and
whether I voted.
7. Voting is similar to a social event and I want to be part of the event. It is fun to
go out and vote.
8. I wanted to vote because I feel that no one is voting for this particular party/
candidate.
9. I wanted to vote because I feel that everyone is voting for this particular party/
candidate.
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Figure 2.2: Expressive voting motives and their relative importance
Note: The figure shows the share of respondents who considers each of the motives as important
or unimportant. Largest number of respondents consider being part of the democratic process
important, followed by the belief that if everyone stayed away from election there would be no
democracy.
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The results are presented in figure 2.2. 67% of the respondents turn out to vote because
they find being part of the democratic process extremely important and 28% find it
somewhat important. This evidence is in line with the procedural utility arguments that
claim that individuals receive utility from participating in the act of voting irrespective
of the outcome Frey et al. (2004). The theory suggests that individuals care not just
about the outcomes but also the procedures that lead to said outcomes. There is a non-
instrumental benefit to people from going to the polls that is beyond the instrumental
benefit of deciding the winner.
The next motive that most of the respondents consider important is the belief that ‘if
everyone thinks their vote does not matter and abstain, there is no democracy’. 66% of
the respondents consider this reasoning as extremely important in their decision to turn
out and 27% consider this somewhat important. This kind of rationale also signals to the
idea of voting as a group responsibility. The situation is likened to group of individuals
(here an electorate of voters) trying to jointly do an activity (here elect a representative)
and the individual decision is whether to join the group or not, as mentioned in Maskivker
(2019).
The third reasoning that most people consider important is expressing solidarity to a
party or candidate. 49% and 39% of the respondents consider this extremely important
and somewhat important respectively. This is followed by expressing gratitude for good
performance or to express dissatisfaction for bad performance of the incumbent (39%
and 42% saying extremely important and somewhat important respectively) and viewing
voting as an act of loyalty to a party/ candidate (28% saying extremely important and
40% saying somewhat important).
Most respondents in our survey do not claim peer pressure as a reason for turning out
to vote. Similarly voting for the underdog or jumping on the bandwagon of a popular
candidate are also stated as unimportant.
We also gave the respondents an option to type in any other reasons that are important
in taking them to the polls in addition to the ones we specifically ask for. This was an
open ended question. We use text analysis to study the responses to this question. Figure
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2.3 represents a word cloud with the most frequently words that appear in the answers
of the respondents.
Figure 2.3: Word cloud: Text analysis of the open-ended responses
Note: Visualization of the most frequently used words of the respondents on why they vote even
when the chances of changing the outcome is very low. Larger the size of the word, the more
people mentioned it in their responses.
Unsurprisingly, the most frequently occurring word is ‘duty ’. Voting as a paramount
civic duty features prominently in the literature since Riker and Ordeshook (1968). The
word ‘citizen’ and ‘civic’ are the next frequently used, mostly in combination with ‘duty ’.
‘Complain’ is a word that is fifth most frequently used. ‘You cannot complain if you did
not vote’ is stated as a reason that takes people to the polls. A similar sentiment was
shared by the former President of the United States Barack Obama in his speech at the
Democratic National Convention in 2016 as “don’t boo, vote”. Individuals often find the
need to legitimize stating political opinions and criticisms of existing elected leaders by
the act of going to the polls.
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Another word that comes up most frequently is ‘fought ’. This is in the context of ‘others
have fought for this right of mine’. The word ‘die’ also comes up in similar context (e.g.,
‘many people died for my right to vote’), so does the word ‘privilege’. Among African
American respondents the words ‘die’ and ‘ancestors ’ are the most frequently used words.
The context in which the latter appear is ‘my ancestors fought for me to have this right ’
or ‘my ancestors did not have this right ’. It is interesting to note that these two words
feature even before the word ‘duty ’. For women, the most frequently used words in order
are: ‘duty ’, ‘citizen’, ‘fought ’, ‘complain’, and ‘civic’.
2.3.2 Expressive voting and other expressive behaviours
Figure 2.4 shows the differences in expressive behaviours between those who vote
expressively and those who do not. Consider the top set of the bar graph, that shows
donations to political parties. The top bar indicates those who vote expressively and
the bottom bar indicates those who do not. 32% of expressive voters say they have
donated to political parties compared to 19% of those who do not vote expressively.
This pattern is repeated across different other expressive behaviours - those who vote
expressively are more likely to engage in other expressive behaviour compared to those
who do not vote expressively.
In case of participation in a strike, protest, march, or demonstration, 22% of
expressive voters and 16% of non-expressive voters say they have participated in at least
one strike, protest, march, or demonstration in the past. Additionally, 54% of expressive
voters say they have made a political post in online social media compared to 43% of
non-expressive voters; 71% of expressive voters say they have signed a petition in the
past compared to 54% of non-expressive voters; 43% of expressive voters say they got in
touch with their elected representatives over phone call, email, post, or directly,
compared to 26% of non-expressive voters; and 55% expressive voters say they
boycotted or bought a product for ethical reasons compared to 40% of non-expressive
voters. This shows that voting expressively is positively correlated with other politically
expressive behaviours.
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Figure 2.4: Expressive voting and other political expressive behaviours
Note: The graph presents the relationship between expressive voting and other political expressive behaviours. The
x-axis shows the share of respondents who engage in each of the activities. Y-axis categorizes them into expressive and
non-expressive voters. The figure shows that more expressive voters engage in political expressive behaviours compared
to non-expressive voters.
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Expressive and non-expressive voters also differ on the questions relating to being a
‘good citizen’. Figure 2.5 represents the results. When it comes to paying taxes 69% of
expressive voters consider it very important compared to 57% of non-expressive voters. In
case of obeying traffic rules the difference is not significant between expressive voters and
non-expressive voters. 71% of expressive voters consider it very important to obey traffic
rules, when a very similar 68% of the non-expressive voters think so too. More expressive
voters than non-expressive voters find it important to keep a close watch on the actions of
the government (67% vs 64%) and being active in social and political associations (14%
vs 10%). 70% of expressive voters consider it very important to always vote in elections
compared to 24% of non-expressive voters.
65
Figure 2.5: Expressive voting and other dimensions of being a good citizen
Note: The graph presents the relationship between expressive voting and other dimensions of being a good citizen. The
x-axis shows the share of respondents. Y-axis categorizes them into expressive and non-expressive voters. The figure
shows that more expressive voters also tend to consider it very important to pay taxes, to obey traffic rules, and other
dimensions of perceived good citizenship.
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Analysing the correlations between expressive voting and the stated political
orientation in the left - right spectrum, we see that respondents who place themselves in
the left or right of the political spectrum are more likely to state that they vote
expressively than those respondents who place themselves at the center of the spectrum
(figure 2.6). A similar pattern is seen in party affiliation, where respondents who are
affiliated with the Democratic or Republican party state that they vote expressively
than those who are not affiliated with either of the parties (figure 2.7).


















Left Left of center Center Right of center Right
Note: The figure presents the fraction of expressive voters conditional on the respondent’s
stated political orientation in the left - right spectrum.
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Democrats Independent/ No preference Republicans
Note: The figure presents the fraction of expressive voters conditional on the respondent’s
stated party affiliation.
2.3.3 Expressive voting and demographic features
Extensive research into voting patterns over decades have shown that individuals with
more years of formal education are more likely to vote. Similar patterns are seen in the
case of incomes, with wealthier people voting at higher rates. Individuals are also more
likely to vote as they get older. An overview of the existing research on demographic
characteristics and voter turnout can be found in Harder and Krosnick (2008).
The evidence for expressive voting also mirrors these patterns. Table 2.2 presents the
relationship between answering ‘yes’ to voting even when the vote will not be decisive
in the outcome and different demographic characteristics. Those belonging to racial
minorities are significantly less likely to vote expressively (11 percentage points). Being
female does not have a significant effect. Those with higher incomes and education levels
are more likely to vote expressively (1.39 percentage points and 1.70 percentage points,
respectively). Age is also positively and significantly related to voting expressively (.37
percentage points)
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No. of Obs. 1787
R-Squared 0.0384
The dependent variable expressive voting takes the value 1 if the
respondent votes even when they know that their vote will not be
decisive. It takes the value 0 otherwise. Racial minority variable takes
value 0 if the respondent is white and 1 if non-white. Gender takes value
1 if respondent is female. Income is an ordinal variable which takes
values 1 to 12 (1 if annual household income is less that 10,000 USD
and 12 if it is more than 150,000 USD). Education is an ordinal variable
which takes value 1 if respondent has less than a high school degree, and
higher values for higher degrees.
Linear Probability Model. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper explores the different motives that individuals have to vote even when they
know that their vote has very low chance of affecting the election outcome. Most of
the motives that come up are interrelated - blurring boundaries between each, making
it hard to categorize each of them into different water tight compartments. However,
our data show that respondents value the mere participation in elections irrespective of
the outcome. They are also guided by their duty as citizens to turn out to vote. Most
respondents also subscribe to the belief that if everyone thinks that their vote does not
matter, there will be no democracy. Voters also turn out to vote believing that if they
don’t vote, they cannot complain about the elected representatives or the state of the
government.
Our analysis also shows that there is a positive correlation between expressive voting
and other dimensions of expressive political behaviours. Respondents who state to vote
even when they cannot change the outcome are also more likely to report having done
other politically expressive behaviours like participating in a strike or protest, signing
a petition, and posting political opinions online. Results also indicate that individuals
who identify as left leaning or right leaning are more likely to state that they would vote
expressively compared to those who identify to be in the center. Similarly, respondents
who strongly identify with a political party (Democrat or Republican) are more likely
to say they vote expressively than those who are not aligned with a party. Our results
also find that demographic factors like income, age, and education are positively linked
to expressive voting, while being a racial minority is negatively linked.
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2.5 Additional Materials
2.5.1 Appendix A - Additional tables
Table 2.3: Expressive voting and other political expressive behaviours
Expressive voting
Donations to political parties 0.0473*
(0.0244)
Participate in strikes -0.00941
(0.0271)
Write to elected representatives 0.0554**
(0.0229)
Sign a petition 0.0673***
(0.0234)
Post political opinion online 0.0196
(0.0212)




No. of Obs. 1672
R-Squared 0.0419
The dependent variable expressive voting takes the value 1 if the
respondent states that they will vote even when they know that their
vote will not be decisive. It takes the value 0 otherwise. Each of the
explanatory variables take value 1 if the respondents state that they have
done the activity in the past.
Linear Probability Model. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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2.5.2 Appendix B - Survey on expressive voting
Welcome to this survey!
This study should take you around 10 minutes to complete, and you will receive an
incentive for your participation. Your participation in this research is voluntary. You
have the right to withdraw at any point during the study, for any reason.
By clicking the button below, you acknowledge that your participation in the study
is voluntary, you are above 18 years of age, and that you are aware that you may
choose to terminate your participation in the study at any time and for any reason.
I consent, begin the survey.






Not interested at all









3. Did you take part in any of the following activities in the past?








3.3 Written / called/ spoken / got in touch with your













3.6 Any other action aimed at influencing rules, laws, or
politics. If so, what action?
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4. People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations. For each
type of group, please indicate whether you : [Belong and actively participate / belong
but do not actively participate / used to belong but do not any more / have never
belonged]
4.1 A political party
Belong and actively participate
Belong but do not actively participate
Used to belong but do not any more
Have never belonged to it
4.2 A trade union, or business association
Belong and actively participate
Belong but do not actively participate
Used to belong but do not any more
Have never belonged to it
4.3 A church or other religious organization
Belong and actively participate
Belong but do not actively participate
Used to belong but do not any more
Have never belonged to it
4.4 A sports, leisure, or cultural group
Belong and actively participate
Belong but do not actively participate
Used to belong but do not any more
Have never belonged to it
4.5 Another voluntary association:
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5. How much do you agree to the statement:






6. Suppose the anticipated electoral outcome is very
clear and you expect that your vote will not be decisive




7. If you answered the previous question with ‘Yes’ or with ‘Maybe’, we would like to
learn more about your motivation to vote.
Below are some motives you may have to vote and please tell us whether the
particular motive would be: [Extremely important / Somewhat important / Somewhat
unimportant / Extremely unimportant]
7.1 I know that my single vote is very unlikely to make a
difference. But if everyone thinks like this and does not





7.2 I want to use my vote to express gratitude for good
performance or to express dissatisfaction for bad





7.3 After the elections I talk to my friends and colleagues






7.4 I see voting as an act of loyalty to my party/






7.5 I wanted to vote because I feel that everyone is





7.6 I wanted to vote because I feel that no one is voting











7.8 Voting is similar to a social event and I want to be











7.10 I vote to express my solidarity to the policy







8. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following statements
8.1 Citizens have the right not to vote.
Agree
Disagree
8.2 Going to vote is a lot of effort.
Agree
Disagree
8.3 It is my responsibility as a citizen to vote in election
Agree
Disagree
8.4 I learnt in school that it is my responsibility as a
citizen to vote in elections.
Agree
Disagree
9. When you get together with your friends, relatives, or
colleagues, how often do you discuss politics?
Always




10. There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a good citizen. For you
personally, please indicate on a scale of very important to very unimportant, how
important is it:






























12.1 Think back to when you were growing up. Do you
know if your mother / father/ guardian voted?
Yes, they voted
No, they did not vote
I do not know
12.2 Do you know which candidate/ political party they
(mother/ father/ guardian) voted for? Please mention the
candidate/ political party if you know. If not, please say
no.
13. What is the highest level of school you
have completed or the highest degree you
have received?
Less than high school degree
High school graduate
Some college but no degree
Associate degree in college (2-year)
Bachelor’s degree in college (4-year)
Master’s degree
Doctoral degree
Professional degree (JD, MD)




15. What is your year of birth?
16. Choose one or more races that you
consider yourself to be:
White
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian
Hispanic
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Other
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17. Please indicate the option that includes


















Not working (temporary layoff)




Prefer not to answer
19. Did you vote in the last election?
Yes
No









Sanctioning, selection, and pivotality in voting -
Theory and experimental results.
This chapter is based on joint work with Kai A. Konrad.1
3.1 Introduction
In democratic regimes voters delegate the decision rights on the choice of public goods
and the power to redistribute to political agents. This principal-agent relationship is
not perfect. The agents are endowed with legislative or executive powers. Ideally, the
political agents act on behalf of the voters. But they might abuse this power to extract
rents for their own benefits, use funds to work on their legacy to history or fund prestige
projects that give little benefits to the voters.
One possible way to discipline elected representatives and to prevent these types of
extractive behavior is the voter’s power over the decision to re-elect these representatives
on the basis of their actions in office. In seminal contributions, Barro (1973) and Ferejohn
(1986) showed how elections may serve to discipline office-holders, and how voters can
sanction politicians in an equilibrium that respects sequential rationality.2
1This chapter is based on the article ‘Sanctioning, selection and pivotality in voting - Theory and
experimental results’ published in 2019 in Constitutional Political Economy, Volume 30, p. 330-357.
2Seabright (1996), Kessing (2010), and Fearon (2011) are applications of sanctioning models with
pure moral hazard in different contexts. However, due to the alleged robustness concerns, much of the
accountability literature turned to a study of a selection model of voting and now focuses on issues
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This retrospective voting hypothesis led to considerable empirical research since the
pioneering work by Kramer (1971). The seminal contribution by Fiorina (1978) drew
attention to retrospective voting on the basis of voters’ personal economic condition.
More recent surveys or original contributions offering literature surveys are Lewis-Beck
and Stegmaier (2000), Alt et al. (2011) and Kayser and Peress (2012). It establishes
a role for retrospective behavior by which economic performance and well-being of the
individual voter matter in her voting decisions. Voters punish incumbents at the ballot
box if they are economically worse off.
This sanctioning mechanism might become inoperative if voters have forward looking
concerns - like selecting the best candidate who maximizes future benefits. Voters might
view elections as a tool to select the best candidate for the office. Considering past
actions of the incumbent sunk, if at an election voters anticipate that one of the available
candidates (say, the incumbent) offers higher future payoffs, there is an incentive to
select that candidate. This forward looking selection motive will dominate and render
the retrospective sanctioning threat empty, when voters are sequentially rational. The
choice of whether to re-elect an elected representative takes place at the end of the office
period. Rent-seeking or appropriation that took place during the office period is sunk
at that point of time. Assuming that feelings of revenge etc. are absent, voters should
be forward looking. Time consistent voting behavior implies that they might even re-
elect such an incumbent, if the alternative is to elect a competitor who does not behave
differently or is even worse. Fearon (1999) made this point very forcefully. Besley (2006),
Woon (2012), and Ashworth (2012) also take up this argument.
This brings us to two questions. Can the threat of not being re-elected, induce
accountable behavior of an incumbent in an equilibrium when voters are fully rational
and have forward looking concerns? Empirically, does this threat result in accountable
behavior? Here, accountable behavior is defined as incumbent acting in the interest of
of adverse selection: it studies how to identify and select the more competent or ideologically more
appealing candidate if a candidate’s true type is private information. This literature is orthogonal to our
research question and is too large to be adequately surveyed here. It includes important contributions
by Fearon (1999), Ashworth (2005), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008), Besley (2006), Besley and
Smart (2007), Snyder Jr and Ting (2008), and Fox and Shotts (2009).
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the voters and not appropriating the resources for herself. In the paper, we contribute
to these two questions. We reconsider the relationship between sanctioning and
selection from a theory perspective as well as using a laboratory experiment. We
assume a two period voting game with one incumbent office-holder, one challenger
politician and many voters. In the first period, the incumbent can take a decision to
extract rent or to act in the interest of voters. This is followed by the voting stage. We
assume that all voters prefer the incumbent to get re-elected. This preference is taken
as exogenous and we call this a selection incentive in favor of the incumbent or an
incumbency advantage.3 It is independent of the incumbent’s actions or performance in
office and the incumbent’s actions and their consequences are sunk at the election
stage.4 In a short theory analysis we identify a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
sanctioning of the incumbent even if all voters have uniform and strong selection
preferences and prefers that the incumbent us re-elected. The main departure from the
literature that brings this equilibrium into existence is the consideration of pivotality
beliefs that become important if the electorate consists of more than one voter and
applies majoritarian voting. The voters’ selection motive dominates any sanctioning
role of elections if voters have strict preferences for one candidate over the other, but
this applies only for those voters who think that they can influence the majoritarian
electoral outcome, i.e., those voters who believe they are pivotal.
We identify an asymmetric equilibrium that has an interesting structure. The
electorate is homogeneous ex-ante, but becomes endogenously divided by the incumbent
into a majority group that is favored by the incumbent and a minority group that is
treated unfavorably. The majority that is favored receives positive benefits from the
incumbent’s actions and the minority that is unfavored receives nothing. The favored
majority constitutes the group of voters who eventually supports and re-elects the
3Modeling incumbency advantage in this way that every voter benefits from the incumbent getting
re-elected is not new in the literature. For example, Buchanan and Congleton (1994) have a setting where
re-election of the incumbent gives the entire constituency a benefit as senior, experienced representatives
are better at their legislative tasks than junior ones.
4An incumbency bias has empirical support. For empirical analysis and discussion see, for example,
Gelman and King (1990), Erikson et al. (2015), and Fowler and Hall (2014).
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incumbent. In this equilibrium each of the favored voters is pivotal in the election
outcome. The minority group is excluded from the distribution of benefits. They still
prefer that the incumbent is re-elected, but in the equilibrium none of these voters has
real voting power. Each of the members in the minority group is non-pivotal in the
equilibrium. The mistreated voters choose to vote against the incumbent. This is
optimal for them, but is a weakly dominated strategy.5 To an outside observer, the
treatment of voters by the politician and the resulting voting behavior may appear to
be reciprocal behavior. It appears as if mutual favoritism between a majority subgroup
of the electorate and the incumbent guides the players’ behavior. However, this
apparent ‘reciprocity’ is only spurious.
The elimination of weakly dominated strategies as well as trembling are plausible
refinement concepts and the fact that the equilibrium would be a victim of such
refinement concepts seemingly makes it less compelling. However, rather than following
such refinement concepts we take an experimental route and check whether and to what
extent laboratory subjects’ behavior is in line with the predictions of such an
equilibrium. This leads to the second part of the paper, where we report a voting
experiment that we conducted. We find a considerable diversity of behavior.
Incumbents who behave more accountably are rewarded by re-election more frequently
than less accountable ones. This holds with and without a selection motive being
present, but a selection motive generally leads to less accountable behavior, and to a
larger re-election probability of the incumbent for given levels of accountability.
We find that voting behavior is influenced by the level of accountability of the
incumbents and the selection incentive. Voters’ belief about the likelihood of their vote
being pivotal in the election outcome (henceforth pivotality beliefs) is influenced by
whether they were part of the majority that was favored by the incumbent or not.
However, we do not observe stronger selection effects on the voters who believe to be
pivotal. On the side of politician behavior, some incumbents choose behavior that is in
5There is a large literature on expressive aspects of voting (Brennan and Buchanan (1984), Hillman
(2010), Brennan and Lomasky (1997), and Brennan and Hamlin (1998)) where the non-pivotal voters
use their vote not to change the outcome of the election, but use their vote to express their support or
dissatisfaction. If we allow for expressive preferences, this result would get stronger.
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line with the equilibrium that favors a majority and the voting behavior in these cases
is qualitatively in line with the predictions made by the equilibrium as well.
Our experiment is related to work by Collier et al. (1987). They find evidence in the
laboratory for voters using a reward-punishment model to induce politicians to act in
their interests. Woon (2012) also sheds a favorable light on retrospective voting. The
paper uses an incomplete information voting experiment where politicians vary in types
and the voters try to match them to a probabilistic state of the world. The paper observes
that voters rely on a retrospective voting behavior.
Feltovich and Giovannoni (2015) also test retrospective and prospective voting
motives (sanctioning and selection respectively) in the laboratory. In their experiment,
the incumbents can appropriate from a given budget, with the remaining amount
distributed equally among the voters. The amount voters receive serves as the main
focus of the retrospective voters. They then allow (non-binding) campaign promises
from the candidates to induce prospective voting concerns. They find that candidates
who promise less appropriation are elected more often indicating prospective voting.
Voters also punish those candidates who break their campaign promises, indicating that
retrospective voting gives credibility to campaign promises/prospective voting. They
also show that voting in line with selection motive requires sophistication from the side
of the voters to evaluate the quality of the candidate and her suitability to the office in
the form of credibility of campaign promise. Often retrospective voting is the simpler
alternative to this cognitively demanding task.
In our experiment we simplify the voters’ task by making the selection incentive as
straightforward as possible. We induce a preference for the incumbent through design by
giving a higher payoff to all the voters if the incumbent is re-elected. We also deviate
from many of the past experiments by introducing majority voting. A single voter may
or may not be pivotal in the election outcome in our setting and our analysis focuses on
this dimension.
Our analysis is also related to the literature on vote buying. Dal Bo (2007) allows for
sophisticated vote-buying strategies by a single candidate. A related mechanism is at
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work in Dahm et al. (2014) in a different context. Both approaches use the fact that
there is a redundancy of votes for reaching a simple majority and that voters can be
influenced by reward mechanisms. Implicitly they give the incumbent politician the right
to make contingent price offers for their votes. What the incumbent pays may not only
depend on the voter’s choice but also on the aggregate electoral outcome. This type
of sophisticated vote-buying requires an ability to commit on the side of the candidate.
We do not assume such commitment. A further literature gives politicians commitment
power to make credible promises about their behavior once they are elected. They also
give both the incumbent and a challenger active roles. Seminal papers are by Myerson
(1993) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001). This type of commitment is absent in the Barro-
Ferejohn framework which we rely on and this lack of commitment is at the center of the
moral hazard problem.
Our game is also mildly related to the ultimatum game literature, particularly the one
with multiple responders. An early paper on this is Kagel and Wolfe (2001). These games
are also about distributional offers to which a group of players reacts. This strand of
literature focuses on identifying the extent to which fairness models explain the decisions
made in ultimatum games with multiple respondents. Diermeier et al. (2006) tests if the
theories of self-interest, egalitarianism or inequality aversion can explain the behavior in
ultimatum games with two responders and reports that the results are inconsistent with
predictions of these three models. Fischer and Güth (2012) use three party ultimatum
games where the proposer can exclude one of the other players from getting a share of
the pie. They do not find evidence to support that this exclusion changes the behavior
of the responder and the non excluded responder.
There are also some important differences between these games and our voting context.
First, the accountability game and the ultimatum game have different structures. In our
framework the allocation choice that is made by the incumbent politician is not subject
to acceptance or rejection by the set of voters: it is implemented in any case. Second,
voters make decisions that might lead to re-election of the incumbent or vote her out of
office. Again, this is not a problem of division of a given pool of resources between them.
Thirdly, in our setting all voters have similar roles - we do not ex-ante differentiate the
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electorate. A fourth conceptual difference is the context. We consciously frame our game
as a voting game. In such a game incumbents and voters are quite different subjects.
Moreover, politicians stay politicians and voter stay voters throughout all rounds. This
makes an egalitarian norm between them less salient than in the ultimatum game.
In the next section we reconsider the standard sanctioning/selection model with both
moral hazard and candidate heterogeneity. Section 3.3 presents the hypotheses, section
3.4 presents the experimental set-up, section 3.5 presents results from the experiment and
section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 A simple voting framework
Our voting framework with an accountability problem has two periods, t = 1 and t = 2.
The set of players consists of a politician who reigns in period 1 and a set N of voters
i = 1, ..., (2n − 1). Politicians and candidates are labeled as female (‘she’) and voters
are male (‘he’) in what follows. In the first stage the incumbent politician has a budget
of given size m = 1. She chooses non-negative period-1 transfers x1, ..., x2n−1 to the
voters. The sum of these transfers cannot exceed the budget m. She keeps the remainder
y = 1 − Σi∈Nxi for herself. In the second stage voters cast their votes. All voters vote.
Each voter chooses between two politicians: the incumbent and a challenger (a player
with no active role and decision options). They vote simultaneously and the majority
rule applies: the politician who receives at least n votes wins.
Payoffs of active players are as follows. The incumbent keeps the amount y of the
budget and this is the payoff if the incumbent is not re-elected. She has an additional
benefit b > 1 and therefore a total payoff of y + b if and only if she wins at least n votes.
This benefit b may be thought of as office rents from being re-elected. The sum of these
constitute the incumbent’s payoff. Voters value their transfer xi. A benefit θ ≥ 0 is added
if the incumbent is re-elected. We address two cases: The voter might be indifferent about
whether the incumbent is re-elected (θ = 0), as in the analysis by Ferejohn (1986). Or the
voter prefers the incumbent and attributes θ > 0 to her re-election as in Fearon (1999).6
6A similar analysis could be carried out for an incumbency disadvantage (θ < 0). We focus on the
case θ > 0 to capture forces acting in opposite directions: an incumbency advantage, that makes the
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Like all other aspects in this model, the size of the incumbency advantage θ is common
knowledge. Voter i’s payoff is the sum of the transfer xi and the benefit θ in case of
re-election of the incumbent.
Let us consider the choice of a voter as a function of (y, x1, ..., x2n−1). Define p̂i as voter
i’s probability belief that i’s vote is pivotal, i.e., the probability which i attributes to the
event that exactly n − 1 of all other voters j vote for the incumbent and all the other
n − 1 voters vote for the challenger. A voter i who maximizes his payoff and attributes
a positive probability p̂i > 0 to being a pivotal voter strictly prefers to vote for the
incumbent if θ > 0 and is indifferent if θ = 0. A voter who attributes a zero probability
p̂i = 0 to being pivotal is precisely indifferent about whether to vote for or against the
incumbent.
This allows us to recover the results of Ferejohn (1986) and of Fearon (1999). If there
is only one single voter, this voter is pivotal with probability 1. Accordingly, this voter
will always vote for the incumbent if θ > 0 (Fearon). If θ = 0, then the voter is indifferent
about whom to vote for and may choose any tie-breaking rule. In particular, the voter
may choose to vote for the incumbent if and only if y = 0, i.e., if the incumbent shows
full accountability. If the incumbent, for some reason, anticipates this tie-breaking rule,
then the incumbent will choose y = 0 and will be re-elected (Ferejohn). For a larger but
uneven number of voters pivotality (and voters’ beliefs about it) becomes an issue. By
choice of a suitable tie-breaking rule it is possible to establish that any choice of y ∈ [0,m]
and a majority of votes for the incumbent can emerge as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
irrespective of the size θ of the incumbency advantage.
Intuitively, for any budget allocation choice a voting subgame exists for which a super-
majority (at least n + 1 of voters) vote for the incumbent. This holds because, if a set
with at least n voters votes for the incumbent, then any of the voters outside this set is
not pivotal and therefore indifferent about whom to vote for. This voter may well vote
voter want the incumbent (irrespective of the action of the incumbent) to be re-elected and the need for
accountability, that requires that an incumbent who diverted part of the budget for private use is voted
out of office. Moreover, the case with an incumbency advantage received much empirical support (see
footnote 4 for references).
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for the incumbent as well. A particular value of y can, for instance, be supported by
tie-breaking choices of indifferent voters such that this is the largest y for which non-
pivotal (and hence indifferent) voters reelect the incumbent: the incumbent is reelected
with a super-majority if the amount kept by her is smaller or equal to this y.7 The
multiplicity of equilibrium has been used by Ferejohn (1986) to support a high degree of
accountability as an equilibrium by making the voter’s equilibrium choice in case of the
voter’s indifference a function of the budget allocation choice.
The behavior of voters who are non-pivotal (and hence indifferent) might be conditioned
on the publicly observed degree of accountability of the incumbent. It may be interesting
to consider the case in which any voter i can condition his behavior only on the amount
of transfer xi which he received. We can characterize the following perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in this case:
Proposition 1 Suppose the incumbent has a strictly positive incumbency advantage.
If n > 1, then a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists that is described by favoritism as
follows. The politician chooses to allocate xj = 1/n to precisely n voters. Each voter
j believes that he is pivotal with probability 1 if he received xj = 1/n, and each voter
believes that he is non-pivotal if xj 6= 1/n. Only the voters who believe that they are
pivotal vote for the incumbent.
The proof is in the appendix. The equilibrium that is characterized in Proposition 1
has some interesting properties. The voters who received transfers vote for the incumbent
and voters who did not receive transfers vote against the incumbent. They behave as if
they reward or punish the incumbent, depending on having been treated well or poorly.
In fact, this electoral outcome is not driven by such desires to reward or punish, or to
7As has been pointed out in the introduction, the equilibria with y > 0 do not survive a refinement
that eliminates weakly dominated strategies, and this may be support of the argument that selection
incentives dominate sanctioning. One should note that even for a strict incumbency advantage (θ > 0)
an equilibrium for which an incumbent is not re-elected need not be very sensitive to perturbations.
Suppose that the expectation is that 2n − 2 other players vote against the incumbent as well. In this
case, this voting behavior remains optimal, even if up to n − 2 of these other voters deviate from their
equilibrium behavior.
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reciprocate favors. It is just a possible equilibrium outcome of forward looking voters.
All voters are sequentially rational and narrowly selfish.
Proposition 1 makes suggestions about how beliefs are formed in the equilibrium. The
voters who received transfers are pivotal and voters who received nothing are not pivotal.
When we move to the experimental section we also provide a behavioural story on how
these beliefs are formed. To the extent that pivotality is interpreted ex-post as a measure
of political connectedness or influence, it seems as though the ones who are politically
connected are the ones who receive transfers. The voters who do not receive transfers are
not among the selectorate. They are also in a minority. They are excluded and deprived
of political influence. The equilibrium appears as if there is a majority of voters who
establish an ingroup, and a minority of voters who form the outgroup. But ex-ante there is
no heterogeneity among voters here, there is no such element of ‘connectedness’ here and
no differences in connectedness. The ingroup-outgroup interpretation with reciprocity
between the incumbent and her selectorate and the apparent causality are purely spurious.
3.3 Hypotheses
Theory considerations showed that there is a large set of equilibrium outcomes.
Refinement concepts tell us that some of these equilibria might be more plausible than
others from a theory point of view. However, an at least equally relevant question is
what voters really do. We first concentrate on predictions about the voting subgames,
which support the following hypotheses about the qualitative behavior in the
laboratory.
H1: Selection hypothesis For any given allocation choices of the incumbents, the
voters are more inclined to vote for the incumbent if the incumbent has an incumbency
advantage.
This hypothesis is a mild version of Fearon’s selection dominance argument. The strict
version of this hypothesis is the claim that sanctioning always dominates the voting
incentives. If all voters prefer a candidate, they all vote for him. Laboratory results are
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typically less deterministic, so the Selection Hypothesis catches the essence of the theory
claim about selection in a qualitative form.
H2: Retrospective voting hypothesis (i) If the incumbent has no incumbency
advantage, voters are more inclined to vote for the incumbent if the incumbent behaved
more accountably. (ii) For any given incumbency advantage, voters are more inclined to
vote for the incumbent if the incumbent behaved more accountably.
This hypothesis is formulated on the basis of the original considerations by Barro (1973)
and by Ferejohn (1986) and reflects the idea of retrospective voting. The weak part of
the hypothesis (i.e., part (i)) refers to Ferejohn’s result that a sanctioning equilibrium
exists if the voters are indifferent about who is in power in the future. The strong part
of the hypothesis (i.e., part (ii)) suggests that this result is also true if one allows for an
incumbency advantage of a given size.
Voters’ payoff from voting for the incumbent is higher if the incumbency advantage is
higher, and if the voter attributes a higher probability to being pivotal in the election. A
voter’s belief about own pivotality probability and incumbency advantage, hence, interact
positively and a higher pivotality belief should therefore make the incumbency advantage
more salient and more influential for the voting decision. This leads to the pivotality
hypothesis.
H3: Pivotality hypothesis The influence of incumbency advantage on voter behavior
is stronger if a voter considers it more likely that he is pivotal.
We can test this hypothesis using the stated beliefs of voters about whether they think
it is more likely or not that their vote is decisive.
In the experiment we will give the incumbent choice alternatives in which all voters are
treated equally and alternatives in which the incumbent can favor a majority of voters,
to the detriment of a minority of voters. In line with the equilibrium behavior that is
characterized in Proposition 1, we would expect behavior along the following lines:
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H4: Favored majorities hypothesis Voters who belong to the favored majority
expect to have a higher probability of being pivotal than voters in a less favored minority.
Moreover, the voters in the favored majority are more likely to vote for the incumbent.
Next we turn to incumbents’ choices. The multiplicity of equilibria in the voting
subgame does not give the incumbent very clear guidance, and one would therefore
expect to see a wide range of possible accountability choices. However, taking the above
probabilistic hypotheses by heart, they imply that an incumbent may consider it more
likely to be re-elected if she has an incumbency advantage. Moreover, for a given
incumbency advantage, the incumbent may consider it more likely to be re-elected if she
behaves more accountably. This is also the clear prediction from Fearon’s claim that
selection considerations dominate, as sanctioning is only time consistent if the voter is
indifferent. Hence, we expect behavior in line with the following
H5: Decreasing accountability hypothesis The incumbent behaves less accountably
if she has an incumbency advantage.
Endowed with these hypotheses we now describe the experimental setting.
3.4 Experimental setting
The experiment was conducted among the students of a large German university in the
months of October and November, 2016. The program was coded in z-Tree (Fischbacher
(2007)) and the subjects were invited through ORSEE (Greiner (2015)). A between-
subjects design was used, i.e., each subject participated in only one treatment. The
instructions for the subjects were handed out to them on paper. In addition, they had to
watch a video in which the instructions were read to them aloud by the same person and
in an unchanged environment for the two treatments.8 Participants were informed of the
anonymity of their decisions and that they were not allowed to communicate with each




other. The subjects also had to undergo mock questions to check their comprehension of
the instructions and the rules of the experiment before proceeding.
Participants were informed that they are part of an interaction resembling a political
process.9 Subjects interacted in groups of five in each treatment. Each group consisted of
one incumbent politician, one challenger politician and three voters. In each group, two
of the subjects were randomly assigned the role of politician (as incumbent or challenger)
and three of the subjects were assigned the role of voter. Subjects were informed of their
roles and kept their respective roles throughout the experiment, i.e. a subject in the role
of a politician remained in that role throughout the experiment.
The voting game consisted of two stages.
Stage 1: The incumbent politician has a budget m = 120 taler10 at her disposal. The
incumbent has one decision to make - to allocate this budget between herself and the
three voters in one of five possible ways as listed in Table 3.1.11
Of these, option 1 [120;(0,0,0)] is where the incumbent retains the whole 120 taler
and distributes nothing to the three voters (the first number in the vector corresponds
to the amount the incumbent keeps for herself and the following three numbers are the
amounts transfered to each of the voters). This is a case of no accountability of the
incumbent office-holder. Option 2 [30;(30,30,30)] and option 4 [60;(30,30,0)] are options
of partial accountability, as the incumbent keeps a smaller or larger share of the budget
for herself. Option 3 [0;(60,60,0)] and option 5 [0;(40,40,40)] are options that are in
conformity with full accountability, as the incumbent distributes the whole budget to
the voters. The five options differ with respect to accountability, but also with respect
to symmetry/asymmetry of treatment of voters. Note that options 1, 2 and 5 treat all
voters perfectly equally both from an ex-ante point of view as well as from the ex-post
9We introduce a non-neutral setting because we want subjects to bring their political behavior and
beliefs on to the laboratory. Additionally this only affects the accountability part of the experiment
which applies to both the treatment and control and is orthogonal to our treatment variation of the
incumbency advantage.
10Taler = Experimental Currency Unit. Conversion: 20 taler = 1 EUR.
11In the experiment we reversed the order in which the five options were listed on the screen in half of
the sessions to control for order effects.
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Table 3.1: Budget allocation vector
Allocation Option Incumbent retains Share of voter 1 Share of voter 2 Share of voter 3
Option 1
[120;(0,0,0)]
120 taler 0 taler 0 taler 0 taler
Option 2
[30;(30,30,30)]
30 taler 30 taler 30 taler 30 taler
Option 3
[0;(60,60,0)]
0 taler 60 taler 60 taler 0 taler
Option 4
[60;(30,30,0)]
60 taler 30 taler 30 taler 0 taler
Option 5
[0;(40,40,40)]
0 taler 40 taler 40 taler 40 taler
Note: the first number in the vector corresponds to the amount the incumbent keeps for herself and the following
three numbers are the amounts transfered to each of the voters. For e.g., in [120;(0,0,0)], 120 is the amount the
incumbent keeps and each of the voter receives 0.
allocation. Options 3 and 4 describe distributions that allocate different amounts of the
budget to different voters. If the incumbent chooses one of the asymmetric options, the
computer determines which of the voters receive positive amounts and which voter gets
zero. Hence, from an ex-ante point of view, the incumbent treats all voters equally. But
from an ex-post point of view, the voters are treated differently, as two voters receive
considerable amounts and one voter receives nothing. As anonymity applies and the
incumbent does not know the identity of voters 1, 2 and 3, these asymmetric outcomes
are implemented by a random mechanism.
Stage 2: After the incumbent has made the allocation decision, the voting decision
follows. The voters make voting choices. These are possibly a function of the allocation
choices made by the incumbent. The voters have to decide to either vote for the incumbent
or for the challenger. However, to elicit more observations, we use the strategy method
for the voting process. Voters have to vote for the incumbent or challenger under each
realizable state of the world. Due to the asymmetry in the amounts voters receive for
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two of the five allocation options, the five allocation choices of the incumbent translate
into seven cases describing the possible situations of an individual voter. These different
situations are listed in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Voters’ choices
Cases Voting preferences
Own-receipt is 0 taler, the other two voters receive 0 taler each,
and the incumbent keeps 120 taler. Incumbent/Challenger
Own-receipt is 0 taler, the other two voters receive 30 taler each,
and the incumbent keeps 60 taler. Incumbent/Challenger
Own-receipt is 0 taler, the other two voters receive 60 taler each,
and the incumbent keeps 0 taler. Incumbent/Challenger
Own-receipt is 30 taler, one other voter receives 30 taler,
another voter receives 0 taler, and the incumbent keeps 60 taler. Incumbent/Challenger
Own-receipt is 30 taler, the other two voters receive 30 taler each,
and the incumbent keeps 30 taler Incumbent/Challenger
Own-receipt is 40 taler, the other two voters receive 40 taler each,
and the incumbent keeps 0 taler Incumbent/Challenger
Own-receipt is 60 taler, one other voter receives 60 taler,
another voter receives 0 taler, and the incumbent keeps 0 taler Incumbent/Challenger
When using the strategy method the voters’ choices are not observed by the politician
at the point of making her choice, and the conditional choices made by the voters are then
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applied to the actual choice made by the incumbent. This procedure is, hence, equivalent
to a strict sequentiality in decision making in which the allocation choice is followed by
the voting choices. The votes that result are tallied and the winner is announced. The
winner of the election receives b = 140 taler (this amount exceeds the initial budget
m = 120 taler).
After the voting choices have been made we elicit the beliefs of voters on how pivotal
their votes were in each of the seven voting choices they made. Voters are asked if they
believed that it was more or less likely that their vote tipped the outcome in the election.
“Tipping” here means that had the voter voted differently, the majority outcome of the
election would have been different. With three voters, a voter’s vote tips the outcome of
the election only if one of the remaining two voters votes for the incumbent and the other
votes for the challenger. In a way the pivotality belief of a voter shows what he thinks
about the voting pattern of the other two voters. This completes the set of decisions to
be made.
Each subject participates in only one session and plays the game of budget allocation
followed by voting decisions eight times in this session. To avoid quasi-repeated games
effects, the participants were randomly re-matched. While voters remained voters and
politicians remained politicians, random re-matching made sure that a voter-subject voted
on a different incumbent in each round, and that the set of co-voters also changed.12
Among politician-subjects the role as incumbent or challenger was randomly chosen in
each round.
At the end of each round, subjects are informed of the allocation vector chosen by the
incumbent, the winner of the election, the number of votes received by the winner and
their own earnings in taler.
Treatments: The two treatments we study are identical along all dimensions except
whether the incumbent politician has an incumbency advantage in the election or not.
12For this purpose the participants were invited in groups of 20 (15 in some sessions in which less than
20 participants showed up). Re-matching occurred among this larger set. For this the participants were
partitioned in four subgroups of 2 politicians and 3 voters, and this partitioning was changed in each
round.
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This difference is simply in the monetary benefits of each voter if the incumbent is re-
elected or not.
In the baseline treatment, voters have the same exogenous monetary benefit irrespective
of whether the incumbent or the challenger is elected. More precisely, each voter receives
20 taler once the election is completed, and irrespective of whether the incumbent or the
challenger is elected. The incumbency advantage is θ = 0 taler. This baseline treatment
is henceforth referred to as the No Incumbency Advantage treatment (NIA).
The second treatment is referred to as the Incumbency Advantage treatment (IA).
The treatment follows precisely the very same rules as the baseline treatment. However,
each of the voters receives 20 taler if the challenger of stage 1 gets elected and 30 taler if
the incumbent gets re-elected. Hence, the incumbency advantage is θ = 10 taler. In this
treatment voters have a larger monetary benefit if the incumbent is re-elected.
The experiment also included post-experiment tests. These comprised standard tests
of social and risk preferences (Murphy et al. (2011); Dohmen et al. (2011)) and a
questionnaire on the Dark Triad. It assesses the participant’s strength of narcissism,
Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, three types of personality traits that were identified
in psychology (see Jones and Paulhus (2014)). Furthermore a set of control questions on
demographic information and past political activity were asked.
3.5 Data and results
We conducted 9 sessions in each treatment with a total number of 345 subjects (175 in
NIA and 170 in IA). Around 61% of the subjects had past political experience and had
voted in at least one election in the past. Of the 345 students 172 (roughly half) identified
as female. Three rounds from the main experiment and one of the post-experiment tests
were randomly chosen for payment. Additionally, there was a show up fee of 6 euros.
The experiment lasted 90 minutes and the average payoff was 22 euros. We now turn to
the various hypotheses.
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3.5.1 Selection vs. retrospection
First we address the hypothesis on selection. A first result is that voters are more likely to
vote for the incumbent when there is a selection incentive (in IA) than when there isn’t (in
NIA), conditional on the transfers received. Figure 3.1 provides descriptive evidence. The
four pairs of columns show the shares of voters who voted for the incumbent for each of
the transfer amount received. Light grey bars represent the NIA treatment (left column)
and the dark grey bars represent the IA treatment (right column). For all four possible
levels of own receipts, voters are significantly more inclined to vote for the incumbent in
IA than NIA (tests of equality of means done using Wilcoxon rank sum tests, p < 0.001).
The difference between the treatments are larger for own receipts of 0 and 30 taler and
the gap closes down for own receipts of 40 and 60 taler.















0 30 40 60
Transfer received
NIA IA
Note: Given the different possible budget allocation choices, a voter can receive
zero, 30, 40 or 60 taler. The four pairs of columns show the shares of voters who
voted for the incumbent for each of these receipts, with observations from the NIA
treatment in light grey (left column) and observations from the IA in dark grey
(right column). For all four possible levels of own receipts, voters are more inclined
to vote for the incumbent in IA than NIA.
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Table 3.3: Effects of selection incentive, own receipts and level of accountability on voting
for the incumbent
Dependent Variable - Vote for the incumbent
(1) (2) (3)
IA 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.114***
(0.0246) (0.0238) (0.0238)







Constant 0.140*** 0.0141 -0.0788
(0.0148) (0.0803) (0.0696)
Controls No Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 11592 11592 11592
R-Squared 0.331 0.337 0.347
Note: Dependent variable takes value 1 if the vote is for the incumbent and 0 if the vote is
for the challenger. IA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an incumbency advantage
(θ > 0) and 0 if there isn’t (θ = 0). Variable Own Receipt is the amount the voter receives.
Partial accountability variable takes 1 when the incumbent makes a non zero transfer to
the voters but retains a part of the budget and 0 otherwise. Full accountability variable
takes 1 when the incumbent transfers the entire budget to the voters and 0 otherwise. They
are both compared to the baseline of No accountability. The controls include experimental
rounds, gender and participation in a past election. Ordinary least squares (OLS). Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.3 provides the regression analysis where the dependent variable, ‘vote for the
incumbent’, is binary and takes value 1 if the vote is for the incumbent and 0 if it
is for the challenger. Here, we report the results from an OLS regression for ease of
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interpretation but they are in line with the results from probit regression (marginal effects
are reported in the online appendix). We use standard errors clustered at the individual
level.13 Column (1) indicates a significant treatment effect - voters are more likely to
vote for the incumbent when there is an incumbency advantage, that is, voters have a
selection incentive irrespective. This is true controlling for the transfers received by the
voters. As predicted by the theory on the dominant role of selection incentives, even the
quantitatively small selection incentive that is caused by the incumbency advantage has
a clear treatment effect that has the predicted sign and is significant. We summarize this
result as the selection result.
Selection result For any given allocation choice of the incumbents, the voters are
more likely to vote for the incumbent when there is an incumbency advantage.
Next we turn to the hypothesis on retrospective voting. Column (1) of Table 3.3
shows that a voter’s probability of voting for the incumbent rises with the transfer
amount received by this voter. Column (2) repeats the same estimation with controls.
Column (3) adds accountability levels to the regression. We define full accountability as
when the incumbent does not keep any of the budget and distributes everything.
Partial accountability is when the incumbent keeps a part of the budget for herself and
transfers the rest to all or some of the voters. A case of no accountability is when the
incumbent panders all of the budget for herself. From the table 3.3, other things being
equal, compared to no accountability, partial accountability of the incumbent increases
the probability of voters voting for the incumbent by 13 percentage points and full
accountability raises it by 16.8 percentage points. Voters who get 0 taler are more likely
to vote for the challenger than the incumbent (Figure 3.1). However, as the own
receipts increase from 0 to 30 taler, voters are more likely to vote for the incumbent in
both treatments. This holds for own transfers of 40 and 60 taler although the
probability of voting for the incumbent is the highest when the transfers are 40 taler in
both the treatments.
13We cluster standard errors at the individual level to account for subjects making the voting decision
in multiple rounds. We also cluster at the experimental session level as an additional conservative
estimation. The results are not qualitatively different and we report them in the appendix.
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0-0-0 0-30-30 0-60-60 30-30-30 30-30-0
Own receipt = 0 Own receipt = 30
NIA IA
Note: The first number in the string of numbers (for e.g., 0 in 0-30-30) corresponds to
the taler received by the voter making the decision where as the next two correspond
to the amounts received by the other two voters. The bars show the share of voters
voting for the incumbent for their corresponding own receipts.
A closer look at the voters who receive 0 taler reveals that in addition to own
receipts, the voters pay attention to the amount received by the other two voters and
how accountable the incumbent was in stage 1 (Figure 3.2, first three sets of bars). In
the no accountability case of option 1 [120;(0,0,0)] the voters who receive 0 taler
overwhelmingly vote for the challenger in both treatments (only 3.93% of the voters
vote for the incumbent in NIA and 15.48% in IA). In the partial accountability case of
option 4 [60;(30,30,0)] 5.48% of the voters who receive 0 taler vote for the incumbent in
NIA and 19.64% in IA. In the full accountability case of option 3 [0;(60,60,0)] this
increases to 19.52% in NIA and 30% in IA, indicating that more voters are willing to
vote for the incumbent when the incumbent was fully accountable than when she was
not, irrespective of their own receipt.
A similar pattern can be observed for voters who receive 30 taler (Figure 3.2, last
two sets of bars). In the partial accountability case of option 2 [30;(30,30,30)], 70.36%
of the voters who receive 30 taler vote for the incumbent in NIA and that increases to
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85.83% in IA. However, in the lower accountability situation of option 4 [60;(30,30,0)]
the percentage of voters voting for the incumbent is lower in both treatments (39.88% in
NIA and 51.43% in IA).
Retrospective voting result In both treatments, voters are more likely to vote for
the incumbents when incumbents behave more accountably.
So far the results can be seen as qualitatively in line with both a mild version of
the selection hypothesis of Fearon (1999) and a mild version of the retrospective voting
hypothesis of Ferejohn (1986). Both types of considerations are seemingly relevant for
the voting decision and none of them dominates the other in a strict sense.
3.5.2 Pivotality
The theory analysis in Section 3.2 highlighted pivotality beliefs of voters and their
potential key role for voting behavior. Beliefs about pivotality should be an element in
voters’ decision making in the context of majority voting. The argument that the
selection motive should dominate all other considerations becomes less compelling when
voters’ pivotality is endogenous. Voting in line with the selection motive has a selection
benefit only if the voter is pivotal. As seen by Propositions 1, this consideration opened
up for a wealth of different voting behaviors that can be seen as equilibrium behavior,
where some of these behaviors may be seen as more plausible than others from a theory
perspective of equilibrium refinement.
These considerations led to the Pivotality hypothesis as well as the Favored majorities
hypothesis. We now turn to the data analysis on these hypotheses.
Before we relate voters’ pivotality beliefs with their electoral choices, we consider these
pivotality beliefs and their distribution. A voter also needs to form beliefs about other
voters’ electoral choices to evaluate their own pivotal probability in the election outcome.
For a theory of this belief formation, one can draw on what psychologists call the theory
of social projection (see, e.g., Marks and Miller (1987)): a voter forms an own belief and
projects this way of belief formation onto the other voters. Voters might believe that
their own ways of how they form their beliefs is no different from how most of the other
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voters form their beliefs. A voter is pivotal in our context if exactly half of the remaining
voters vote for incumbent and the other half vote for the challenger.
If a voter A is confronted with two other voters B and C who receive identical transfers
this may induce the belief that it is more likely that they make the same decision; hence
A is unlikely to be pivotal. If B and C are treated differently - say B receives transfers
from the incumbent and not C, it appears as less likely that they make identical electoral
decisions; hence, A is more likely to be pivotal.For the budget allocations that attribute
positive and identical amounts to two of the voters and zero to a third voter, in the
equilibrium the voter who receives zero anticipates that he is not pivotal - and also
observes that the two other voters receive identical amounts. Instead, each of the voters
who receives a positive amount anticipates that he is pivotal - and also observes that the
other two voters do not receive identical amounts.
This leads us to a prediction about voters’ pivotality beliefs as a function of the transfers
xvoter1, xvoter2 and xvoter3 which is expressed in the Table 3.4. The table also provides the
overview of voters’ stated pivotality beliefs. It shows that the stated pivotality beliefs
are, in fact, correlated with the predictions emerging from these considerations. The
correlation between the stated pivotality beliefs and actual pivotality is also positive
(Spearman’s correlation coefficient is 0.1338 with p < 0.001 from 8,273 observations.14)
According to this line of thought, we would expect the likelihood that all voters vote
identically is higher for symmetric allocations than for the asymmetric allocations. If all
voters vote identically, we define the outcome to be a super-majority. A super-majority
for the incumbent is when the incumbent receives all three votes and a super-majority for
the challenger is when the challenger receives all three votes. The outcomes in symmetric
allocations of option 1 [120;(0,0,0)], option 2 [30;(30,30,30)] and option 5 [0;(40,40,40)]
would be super-majorities and the asymmetric allocations of option 3 [0;(60,60,0)] and
option 4 [60;(30,30,0)] would not be super-majorities.
This can indeed be observed in the data. We can see that 75% of the cases option 1
[120;(0,0,0)] is chosen result in a super-majority for the challenger, while 52% of cases
14Since the data series is binary we also report a Tetrachoric correlation coefficient of 0.2158 with
p < 0.001.
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Table 3.4: Overview of pivotality beliefs








Note: Bold number refers to own receipt of the voter. The predicted pivotality refers
to whether the voter (who receives the amount in bold) is expected to be pivotal or
not, assuming social projection. The third column indicates the percentage of voters
who receive the amount in bold who believe that they are pivotal in the election
outcome. Note that the pivotality beliefs correlate with the predicted pivotality.
in option 2 [30;(30,30,30)] and 84% of cases in option 5 [0;(40,40,40)] result in a super-
majority for the incumbent. Figure 3.3 graphically represents this.
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Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 
[120;(0,0,0)]  [30;(30,30,30)] [0;(60,60,0)] [60;(30,30,0)] [0;(40,40,40)]
Allocation vector
Note: The y-axis indicates the number of votes accruing to the incumbent. Thus,
a number of 0 votes accruing to the incumbent indicates a super-majority for
the challenger and a number of 3 votes accruing to the incumbent indicates
a super-majority to the incumbent. The size of the circles indicates in each
allocation vector what share of cases resulted in each number of votes. The three
symmetric allocations of option 1 [120;(0,0,0)], option 2 [30;(30,30,30)] and option 5
[0;(40,40,40)] result mostly in super-majorities (for the challenger in the former and
for the incumbent in the latter two cases). The asymmetric allocations of option 3
[0;(60,60,0)] and 4 [60;(30,30,0)] do not result in super-majorities as the major share
of cases result in either two votes for the incumbent or two votes for the challenger.
Next we compare voting for the incumbent as a function of own pivotality beliefs, for the
two treatments. We hypothesize that the effect of the incumbency advantage is stronger if
the voter believes that he is pivotal. Table 3.5 looks at this analysis. Simply believing to
be pivotal does not affect voting behavior. Being in the incumbency advantage treatment
increases the decision to vote for the incumbent by 11.4 percentage points (Column (6)).
However, the interaction between IA treatment and belief = pivotal is not significant as
indicated in Column (8). This result does not change qualitatively even if we control for
the transfers received by the voters and use a slightly different specification (Table 3.6).
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Table 3.5: Effects of pivotality beliefs on voting for the incumbent
Dependent Variable - Vote for the incumbent
NIA IA All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
belief = pivotal 0.0176 0.0121 0.0188 0.00954 0.0168 0.0110 0.0212 0.0181
(0.0253) (0.0248) (0.0351) (0.0330) (0.0211) (0.0207) (0.0259) (0.0261)
IA 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.120*** 0.120***
(0.0246) (0.0238) (0.0276) (0.0267)
IA * belief = pivotal -0.00921 -0.0147
(0.0388) (0.0379)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 0.0353** -0.0129 0.156*** -0.0350 0.0378** -0.0797 0.0357** -0.0835
(0.0137) (0.0729) (0.0342) (0.118) (0.0160) (0.0693) (0.0164) (0.0685)
No. of Obs. 5880 5880 5712 5712 11592 11592 11592 11592
R-Squared 0.437 0.441 0.394 0.405 0.422 0.428 0.422 0.428
Note: Dependent variable takes value 1 if the vote is for the incumbent and 0 if the vote is for the challenger. belief = pivotal
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the voter believes that he is pivotal in the election outcome and 0 otherwise. IA is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an incumbency advantage (θ > 0) and 0 if there isn’t (θ = 0). The controls include
experimental rounds, gender, participation in a past election and social preferences. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: Effects of pivotality beliefs on voting for the incumbent for each of the strategy
cases
Dependent Variable - Vote for the incumbent
Strategy cases
(0,0,0) (0,30,30) (0,60,60) (30,30,30) (30,30,0) (40,40,40) (60,60,0)
IA 0.0977*** 0.176*** 0.108* 0.132*** 0.255*** 0.0569** -0.0333
(0.0358) (0.0423) (0.0586) (0.0412) (0.0863) (0.0259) (0.107)
belief = pivotal 0.0452 0.0625* 0.0448 -0.266*** 0.323*** -0.0538 -0.0279
(0.0284) (0.0337) (0.0625) (0.0603) (0.0543) (0.0452) (0.0692)
IA * belief = pivotal 0.0924 -0.0885 -0.00441 0.120 -0.203** 0.00522 0.118
(0.0915) (0.0683) (0.0945) (0.0782) (0.0998) (0.0510) (0.111)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.0474 -0.104 0.0614 0.833*** 0.00987 0.989*** 0.341**
(0.0941) (0.100) (0.138) (0.116) (0.149) (0.0729) (0.156)
No. of Obs. 1656 1656 1656 1656 1656 1656 1656
R-Squared 0.0693 0.0656 0.0425 0.143 0.0987 0.0250 0.0540
Note: Dependent variable takes value 1 if the vote is for incumbent and 0 if the vote is for the challenger. belief = pivotal
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the voter believes that he is pivotal in the election outcome and 0 otherwise. IA is
a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an incumbency advantage (θ > 0) and 0 if there isn’t (θ = 0). The table shows
interactions of treatment and pivotality belief on the decision to vote for the incumbent. The regression analysis is done
separately for each of the seven strategy cases that result from the allocation vectors. The controls include experimental
rounds, gender, participation in a past election and social preferences. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. (In the controls experimental round effects are
significant at the 5% level with a co-efficient of -0.0036.)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Pivotality result: Voters who believe they are pivotal are not more likely to vote for
the incumbent when there is a selection incentive.
To look at why we do not find evidence for this hypothesis, we look at how the beliefs
are formed. While voters’ pivotality beliefs and actual pivotality are correlated in the
data, we also have a hypothesis on how beliefs depend on the allocation vector chosen
by the incumbent and voters’ own share of the transfers received. The favored majorities
hypothesis states that voters who belong to the favored majority expect to have a higher
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probability of being pivotal than voters in the less favored minority. We test this by
looking at the effect of being the recipient of the non-zero amounts in option 3 [0;(60,60,0)]
and option 4 [60;(30,30,0)] on the pivotality belief. The voters who receive 60 taler in
option 3 and 30 taler in option 4 belong to the favored majority and the voters who
receive 0 taler in these options are in the less favored minority.
Table 3.7: Effects of being in the favored majority on pivotality beliefs
Dependent Variable - Pivotality belief
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Favored Majority 0.437*** 0.437*** 0.379*** 0.315***
(0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0376) (0.0398)
IA 0.0183 -0.0400 -0.0332
(0.0303) (0.0461) (0.0464)
Favored Majority * IA 0.117** 0.117**
(0.0572) (0.0572)
Controls No No No Yes
Constant 0.329*** 0.320*** 0.349*** 0.294***
(0.0231) (0.0280) (0.0319) (0.0906)
No. of Obs. 6624 6624 6624 6624
R-Squared 0.192 0.193 0.196 0.206
Note: Dependent variable takes value 1 if the voter beliefs that he is pivotal and
0 otherwise. Favored majority is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the voter
belongs to a majority that is favored by the incumbent. This implies that the
voter received a positive amount in an asymmetric allocation vector chosen by
the incumbent, i.e., either 30 taler in option 4 [60;(30,30,0)] or 60 taler in option
3 [0;(60,60,0)]. IA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an incumbency
advantage (θ > 0) and 0 if there isn’t (θ = 0). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.7 reports these results. Pivotality beliefs are affected by whether the voter is
in the favored majority or not (Column (1)). Being in the favored majority increases the
probability of a voter believing to be pivotal by 43.7 percentage points.
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Favored majorities result Voters receiving a positive transfer and thus belonging to
the favored majority are more likely to expect to be pivotal than voters who are in the less
favored minority.
Pivotality beliefs are not affected by the treatment manipulation, i.e., whether there is
an incumbency advantage or not (Column (2)). However, the interaction term between
the favored majority and the treatment indicator (IA) has a coefficient of 0.117 and is
significant at the 5% level. This indicates that voters in the favored majority in the IA
treatment are 11.7 percentage points more likely to believe to be pivotal. This implies
that beliefs are not entirely independent of the treatment manipulation. This could be a
potential reason why we do not observe selection incentive being stronger on voters who
believe to be pivotal. The selection incentive and pivotality beliefs interact in our data.
3.5.3 Incumbents and accountability
We now turn to the decisions made by incumbents. Given that voters react differently
in the two treatments to the allocation choices made by the politician, one might expect
that the incumbent behavior also differs in the two treatments.
Evidence for the decreasing accountability hypothesis is obtained by looking at the
average transfers observed in the two treatments. The transfers chosen by the incumbents
averaged 91 taler in NIA and 88 taler in IA. The transfers are statistically different in
the two treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p < 0.001).
Though the transfers in IA are lower than NIA, roughly three quarters of the budget
is allocated to the voters by the incumbent in IA. The incumbents appear to take the
retrospective voting into account even when there is a selection incentive.
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[120;(0-0-0)] [30;(30-30-30)] [0;(60-60-0)] [60;(30-30-0)] [0;(40-40-40)]
NIA IA
Note: The figure shows percentage of incumbents choosing each of the allocation
vectors. Percentage of incumbents choosing partial accountability options of
[30;(30,30,30)] and [60;(30,30,0)] is higher in IA than in NIA and the percentage of
incumbents choosing the full accountability options of [0;(60,60,0)] and [0;(40,40,40)]
is lower in IA than in NIA.
There are also differences in the allocation vectors chosen by the incumbent as indicated
by Figure 3.4. Interestingly, both of the full accountability options see a drop in the IA
treatment compared to the NIA treatment. There is a corresponding increase in the
partial accountability options in the IA treatment compared to the NIA treatment. The
fall in full accountability options is not seen to co-exist with a rise in the no accountability
option of [120;(0,0,0)], but rather with a rise in the partial accountability options. This
implies that even in the presence of a selection incentive, some accountability is retained.
It is also important to note that 45% of incumbents transfer the entire budget to the
voters when there is no incumbency advantage in an attempt to win them over. In
comparison only 28% of incumbents transfer the entire budget when there is an
incumbency advantage. This indicates that the subjects in IA seem to understand that
they have a large leeway to allocate a part of the budget to themselves.
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Table 3.8: Expected payoff of incumbents
NIA IA
Allocation vector Expected payoff % of incumbents Expected payoff % of incumbents
[120;(0,0,0)] 120.63 10.18 129.02 6.08
[30;(30,30,30)] 140.39 37.50 162.37 48.07
[0;(60,60,0)] 89.44 10.18 101.80 4.42
[60;(30,30,0)] 85.94 8.75 110.77 17.31
[0;(40,40,40)] 136.26 33.39 138.09 24.13
Note: Expected payoff is in taler and is calculated using voting choices observed during the experiment.
Voters’ behavior is not deterministic, but the results revealed some patterns.
Incumbents who observe these patterns might choose budget allocations that maximize
their payoffs given these patterns. In fact, calculating the ex-post expected earnings
from choosing each allocation vector using the voting probabilities indicates that
incumbents are able to exploit this pattern. Table 3.8 displays the expected payoffs of
the incumbents for each allocation vector calculated using the re-election probabilities
from the data. It shows that incumbents choose the budget allocations that give them a
higher expected payoff with a higher probability.
Decreasing Accountability Result When there is an incumbency advantage the
incumbent behaves less accountably compared to the case of no incumbency advantage.
However, some degree of accountability is retained even when there is a selection
incentive.
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[120;(0-0-0)] [30;(30-30-30)] [0;(60-60-0)] [60;(30-30-0)] [0;(40-40-40)]
NIA IA
Note: The figure shows what share of incumbents choosing each of the allocation
vector, gets re-elected.
Figure 3.5 indicates the re-election probabilities of the incumbents for each allocation
vector they choose. It differs for the two treatments. In NIA treatment, the highest
probability of re-election is for the allocation vector [0;(40,40,40)]. Here the incumbent
distributes the entire budget to the voters and hence is a case of full accountability. The
second highest probability is for allocation vector [0;(60,60,0)], again an option of full
accountability. The partial accountability options of [30;(30,30,30)] and [60;(30,30,0)] are
preferred in this order after the former two.
In case of IA, the incumbents have the highest probability of getting re-elected when the
allocation vector is [0;(40,40,40)]. Incumbents choosing the vector [30;(30,30,30)] has the
next highest probability of re-election. This is followed by allocation vectors [0;(60,60,0)]
and [60;(30,30,0)].
Incumbents deciding to appropriate the entire budget of 120 taler do not get re-elected
even with the induced incumbency advantage. The difference between the two treatments
is seen on the two partial accountability cases of [60;(30,30,0)] and [30;(30,30,30)]. When
there is a selection incentive voters are more likely to re-elect the incumbents who are only
partially accountable than in the baseline treatment. The re-election probability of an
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incumbent choosing [60;(30,30,0)] increases from 20% to 41% as a result of the treatment.
For an incumbent choosing [30;(30,30,30)] this increases from 70% to nearly 97%. This
indicates that voters do not press for full accountability when there is a selection incentive.
On the other hand the selection incentive does not bite to the extent that they are willing
to re-elect an incumbent who retains the entire budget. Accountability does not disappear
entirely in the presence of a selection motive.
3.6 Conclusion
The incumbent officeholder in a democracy with majoritarian elections might or might
not act in the best interest of the voters. An incumbent politician could use the office
to extract rents. We assess the quality of majoritarian elections as a disciplining device.
More specifically, we consider voting behavior of a set of voters who face an electoral
decision of re-electing an incumbent in a framework with and without an incumbency
advantage. We investigate if the voters can hold the incumbent officeholder accountable
to them in these two settings.
We find that the set of voting equilibria is very large, due to the pivotality issue and
the formation of pivotality beliefs. Some of these equilibria are observationally
equivalent to behavior that appears to be driven by incumbents’ favoritism and by
voters’ preferences for reciprocity. We confront these theoretical results with evidence
obtained from a laboratory experiment. We find qualitative evidence on voting behavior
that is broadly in line with a theory suggesting that voters cast their votes
prospectively. If voters have a higher future benefit from re-electing the incumbent, this
yields a higher re-election probability. An incumbency advantage reduces the power of
the voting mechanism to prevent incumbent governments from extracting. But we also
find evidence for retrospective voting, where retrospective voting is slightly less
pronounced if voting against an incumbent who behaved unaccountably is conflicting
with voters’ higher future benefit of re-election.
We find that voters’ pivotality beliefs are influenced by whether incumbent politicians
treat all voters alike, or whether they cultivate a favored majority. Voters in the favored
113
majority assume they are more likely to be pivotal than the minority voters. These
beliefs are correct on average. However, we see that these voters are not significantly
more likely to re-elect the incumbent when there is a selection incentive compared to
those who believe they are non-pivotal. One potential reason for this could be that the
pivotality beliefs are not independent of the treatment variation. Voters in the incumbency
advantage treatment are more likely to believe they are pivotal when they belong to the
favored majority.
We also see that the behavior of incumbents reflects the observed voting behavior of
the voters. Incumbents do not take full advantage if there is a selection incentive in
their favor. Rather, the amount of accountability is qualitatively very similar to that of
incumbents who do not have an incumbency advantage. We conclude that an exogenously
given incumbency advantage makes the incumbent extract somewhat more, but typically
not the maximum amount that would be feasible. Voters are able to use retrospective
voting as a mechanism to discipline the officeholder. A large share of the incumbents
seemingly anticipate correctly that extractive government that takes full advantage is
sanctioned by the voters in the equilibrium.
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3.7 Additional Materials
3.7.1 Appendix A - Proof for Proposition 1
This appendix offers a proof for Proposition 1. Denote by λi whether a voter i votes for
the incumbent (λi = 1) or for the challenger (λi = 0). Player i chooses λi ∈ {0, 1} that
maximizes
p̂i(xi)λiθ. (3.1)
Consider the following equilibrium candidate set of pivotality beliefs for all voters:
p̂i(xi) =
 1 if xi = 1n0 otherwise (3.2)
If voter i believes that p̂i(xi) > 0, he votes for the incumbent. If a voter believes that
p̂i(xi) = 0, he may vote for the incumbent or against the incumbent, as i’s payoff is
independent of i’s vote. Let the voters’ tie-breaking rule be that λi = 1 in case of
indifference if xi ≥ 1/n, and λi = 0 otherwise. Given this, the incumbent is re-elected if
and only if she gives transfers xi = 1n for at least n voters. Note that n such transfers
just exhaust her budget for xi = 1n , that this leads to n voters who believe that they are
pivotal and n− 1 voters who think they are not pivotal, and these pivotality beliefs are
correct in the candidate equilibrium. Turn to the incumbent’s choice. The incumbent
anticipates that she is re-elected if and only if she allocates xi = 1/n to exactly n voters.
As b > 1 the incumbent prefers to choose xi = 1n to precisely n voters to any other choice.
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3.7.2 Appendix B - Additional tables
Table 3.9: Effects of selection incentive, own receipts and level of accountability on voting
for the incumbent (Probit regression)
Dependent Variable - Vote for the incumbent
(1) (2) (3)
Treated (=IA) 0.402*** 0.114*** 0.114***
(0.0849) (0.0238) (0.0238)







Constant -1.101*** 0.0141 -0.0788
(0.0615) (0.0803) (0.0696)
Controls No Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 11592 11592 11592
Note: Dependent variable takes value 1 if the vote is for the incumbent and 0 if the vote
is for the challenger. Treated is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an incumbency
advantage (θ > 0) and 0 if there isn’t (θ = 0). Variable Own Receipt is the amount
the voter receives. Partial accountability variable takes 1 when the incumbent makes a
non zero transfer to the voters but retains a part of the budget and 0 otherwise. Full
accountability variable takes 1 when the incumbent transfers the entire budget to the voters
and 0 otherwise. They are both compared to the baseline of No accountability. The controls
include experimental rounds, gender, participation in a past election. Marginal effects from
Probit regression. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.10: Effects of selection incentive, own receipts and level of accountability on
voting for the incumbent (clustered at the session level)
Dependent Variable - Vote for the incumbent
(1) (2) (3)
Treated (=IA) 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.114***
(0.0176) (0.0191) (0.0191)







Constant 0.140*** 0.0897 -0.00440
(0.0135) (0.0802) (0.0651)
Controls No Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 11592 11592 11592
R-Squared 0.331 0.338 0.347
Note: Dependent variable takes value 1 if the vote is for the incumbent and 0 if the vote is
for the challenger. IA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an incumbency advantage
(θ > 0) and 0 if there isn’t (θ = 0). Variable Own Receipt is the amount the voter receives.
Partial accountability variable takes 1 when the incumbent makes a non zero transfer to
the voters but retains a part of the budget and 0 otherwise. Full accountability variable
takes 1 when the incumbent transfers the entire budget to the voters and 0 otherwise. They
are both compared to the baseline of No accountability. The controls include experimental
rounds, gender and participation in a past election. Ordinary least squares (OLS). Standard
errors are clustered at the session level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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3.7.3 Appendix C - Instructions for the experiment
Welcome to this experiment! Please read the following instructions carefully and
completely before you start. A comprehensive understanding of the instructions helps
you earn more money.
Your earnings in the experiment will be measured in ‘Taler’. Once the experiment is
completed, the Taler that you have earned will be converted into cash and paid to you in
private. For every 20 Taler you earn, you receive 1 Euro in cash. Additionally, you also
receive a show up fee of 6 Euros.
Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with other participants during
the course of the experiment. If you do not obey this rule we reserve the right to ask
you to leave the room and not pay you the show up fee. If you have any questions or
clarifications please raise your hand and we will help you.
The Tasks
You take part in an interaction that resembles a political process with political decision
making and voting. You are, with four other participants, randomly assigned to a group
of five. In each group there are two politicians - an incumbent and a challenger, and
three voters. At the beginning of the experiment you will be assigned to either the role
of a politician or the role of the voter.
The political interaction proceeds according to the following rules.
1. Each politician has to decide on how to allocate a budget of 120 taler if s/he is the
incumbent politician in the first office period. There are five possible ways in which the
budget can be allocated (as indicated in Table 3.1).
These options will appear on the computer screen of each politician.
2. Once the politicians have made their choices, one of the politicians is randomly
chosen as the incumbent politician. The option chosen by this politician is implemented.
The option chosen by the politician who becomes the challenger is not implemented.
Payment to the voters and the incumbent politician in this stage depends on the option
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chosen by the incumbent. Irrespective of the options chosen by incumbent, the challenger
receives a fixed payment of 25 taler from the laboratory.
3. Consider the voting stage. Each voter knows the size of the budget and the five
options from which politicians choose. Each voter knows that s/he receives either 0, 30,
40 or 60 taler. A table appears on voters computer screen and each voter is asked whether
s/he gives her vote to the incumbent or to the challenger for each possible transfer. Note
that the actual amount to be received by the voter is already determined, but not yet
known to the voter. So by answering these questions the voter cannot affect the choice
behavior of the politician.
The format for voting is as given in Table 3.2:
4. The voters are asked whether they think that their own vote tipped the outcome in
the election. “Tipping” here means that had the voter voted for the other politician, it
would have made him (her) the winner. Note that a voters vote tips the outcome of the
election only if one of the other voters votes for the incumbent and the other votes for
the challenger. Neither the other voters nor the politicians can observe a voters choices.
This completes the set of decisions. The computer now allocates the payments to the
voters according to the option chosen by the incumbent politician. If the option chosen
by the incumbent politician allocates different amounts to different voters, the computer
randomly allocates the amounts to the three voters. Based on these budget allocations,
the computer applies the voting decisions of the voters to determine the votes received
by the incumbent and challenger. The politician who receives two or three votes wins
the election. The other politician who receives zero or one vote loses the election. The
politician who is elected receives a payment of 140 taler and can keep this amount for
himself (herself). The politician who is not elected receives no further income at this
stage.
No Incumbency Advantage treatment: In addition, each voter receives a payment
of 20 taler in this stage.
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Incumbency Advantage treatment: In addition, each voter receives a payment of
30 taler if the former incumbent obtains at least two votes and a payment of 20 taler if
the incumbent receives zero or one vote.
The incumbent, the challenger, and all voters are informed about the option chosen by
the incumbent, the winner of the election, the number of votes given to the incumbent
and challenger and their own earnings in taler. This ends the round.
The procedure
The main part of the experiment consists of 8 identical and independent rounds. Each
round follows the same rules as described above.
Players keep their respective roles as politicians or voters throughout the experiment.
The politicians keep their roles as politicians and a random mechanism is used in each
round to determine which of them is the incumbent and challenger. The voters continue
to be in the role of voters.
The players that interact in a given round are randomly regrouped with other players
from one round to the next, and so on for all rounds. This means that you as a participant
are typically matched with new, other players in each new round. You will not know who
your co-players are in any given round. Any attempt to reveal the identity by a player
leads to exclusion from the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, three random rounds will be chosen from the eight
rounds. The choices and outcomes in these three rounds, and only these rounds, count
for your payment. The results from the other five rounds are irrelevant for payment.
However, during the experiment you will not know which three of the eight rounds are
relevant for the payment, and which ones are not.
The taler you received or earned in the three payment relevant rounds will be summed
up. The amount of taler is converted into Euro (20 taler = one Euro). This determines
the payment you receive.
In addition, you receive a participation fee of 6 Euro.
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The sum of payments will be made to you in cash when you leave the laboratory.
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked to answer a number of questions which
appear on your screen. These are about the experiment. They are meant to illustrate
the rules and procedures of the experiment by way of examples.
We also request you to answer further questions at the end of the experiment. All the
answers you give and all the decisions you make during the experiment will be treated
anonymously. No connection can be made between these answers and your name/identity.
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